DOUBLE PREDESTINATION, AUGUSTINIAN TRADITION AND CAROLINGIAN ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS

THE DEBATE ON DOUBLE PREDESTINATION AS IT STARTED IN THE NORTHERN REALM

This article is the first part of a study that is primarily a historical overview of the predestination debate that occurred in the Carolingian realm in the 9th century. The two parts of the study endeavor first to clarify the theological positions of the various protagonists and, consequently, to take into account the personalities and the monasteries involved, the treatises written and the councils assembled. Then, as all participants concentrated on the 'right' interpretation of Augustine's views on predestination, grace and merit, divine omnipotence and human free will, divine predilection and universal salvific will, it goes without saying that the influence of Augustine within the 9th-century debate on predestination will be discussed as well.[1] However, while concentrating on the historical reception of the above mentioned Augustinian theological views, the two articles that compose this study will not completely overlook various other factors such as pastoral discourse, political interests and personal ambitions, which may have contributed to the development of

[1] In this respect, I am referring to Devisse's hypothesis of two possible theological traditions in the Carolingian realm: the Northern one, around Rheims, under the Anglo-Saxon influence of Alcuin and Bede, developing a moderate Augustinian stand, inspired by the works of Prosper of Aquitaine, and the Southern one, around Lyons, characterised by a rigorous Augustinian stand due to the fact that most of the Augustinian manuscripts were available in Lyons, but not in Rheims before Hincmar, who tried to fill this gap. See Jean Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims: 845-882*, Genève, Droz, 1975, vol. I, p. 206-214, 269. See also a more nuanced view in John J. O'Meara, *Eriugena*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1988, p. 33. O'Meara notes the existence of some Augustinian 'pockets' such as Corbie in the 'northern' zone. Thus, both Gottschalk of Orbais and John Scot Eriugena, two of the main participants in the debate, were, according to O'Meara, 'conversant with the full Augustinian doctrine'.

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the debate. This first part of the study offers a brief introduction to the debate and considers the above mentioned matters in as much as they were first discussed primarily in the northern parts of the Carolingian realm. A second part of the study (to be published also in the RHE) will consider the same matters as they were discussed in the southern parts of the Carolingian realm, will take into account the new developments generated by the intervention of the South and will offer some conclusion to the entire debate and study.

Predestination became a controversial theological issue in the Carolingian world in 848, when the Saxon monk Gottschalk of Orbais (c.803-867/9) asserted the idea of double predestination—of the elect to eternal life and of the reprobate to eternal death—and presented it as Augustine's standpoint. For roughly a decade (848-860), such an idea was debated as a possible misinterpretation of Augustine's views. It was also considered a real menace for the institution of the Church and for its sacraments as media of salvation. According to most of the participants in the debate, double predestination could considerably impede the attempts of the clergy to promote the spiritual progress of the believers—these might deduce from it that any effort towards salvation was superfluous as long as God had already decreed their fate. Thus, the idea of double predestination could diminish the authority of the clergy in general and especially of the bishops.

Numerous ecclesiastical authorities and scholars were involved in this debate. Among them were Hrabanus Maurus (c.780-856), Hincmar of Rheims (c.806-882), Lupus of Ferrières (c.805-c.862), Ratramnus of Corbie (d.c.870), John Scot Eriugena (c.810-c.877), Prudentius of Troyes (d.861), Florus of Lyons (c.810-c.860), Amolo of Lyons (d.852) and Remigius of Lyons (d.875). King Charles the Bald (843-877) seems to have also been interested in the debate. He actually commissioned the writing of some treatises and participated in some of the councils. Moreover, as Janet Nelson pointed out, Gottschalk had powerful friends and patrons throughout his career and his condemnation may have been just 'a peg on which to hang other, political interests'.[2] Important cen-

[2] Janet Nelson, *Charles the Bald: Court and Kingdom*. London, Longman, 1992, p. 31.

tres of the debate were the monasteries of Rheims, Lyons, Fulda, Hautvillers, Corbie, and Orbais. The conciliar assemblies concerned with the issue of double predestination were: Mainz (848), Quierzy I (849), Quierzy II (853), Valence (855), Langres (859), Savonnières (859), and Tusey (860).

In spite of the significant number of personalities, monasteries and councils involved and also of the treatises written, which provide a rich source material, the 9th-century debate on predestination is still insufficiently researched. It was indeed only in the 20th-century that Germain Morin discovered and Cyril Lambot edited many of Gottschalk's texts,[3] which will be discussed in the two articles composing this study, but that did not impede scholars from trying to account for different aspects of the debate. However, a comprehensive historical overview of the entire theological controversy, which would also take into consideration the latest findings in the most recent scholarship, has not been attempted yet. By that I mean that either the treatises or the councils or some of the personalities involved are, in turn, slightly overlooked in most of the existing literature on the 9th-century debate on predestination.

Scholars and clerics such as Mauguin, Sirmond, Cellot and Noris offered important contributions to the explanation of the 9th-century predestination debate as early as the 17th-century, but they were often quite partial due to the context in which they were writing.[4] (And so is sometimes also later scholarship

[3] Until 1930 only the two *Confessions* of Gottschalk were available. The rest of his work was considered lost. In 1930, Germain Morin found some manuscripts in Bern and demonstrated that they were the work of Gottschalk—see Germain Morin, *Gottschalk retrouvé*, in *Revue bénédictine*, 43 (1931), p. 303-312. The dates of the various texts as well as the integral texts themselves cannot be established with certainty, as C. Lambot, the one who edited them for publication in 1945, noted—see C. Lambot, *Introduction*, in *Œuvres Théologiques et Grammaticales de Godescalc d'Orbais*, ed. Cyril Lambot (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 20). Louvain, Bureaux du SSL, 1945, p. ix-xxiv.

[4] The two *Confessions* of Gottschalk were published for the first time by J. Usher, in his *Gottescalchi et praedestinatianae controversiae … historia*, Dublin, 1631. But the 9th-century debate on predestination gained in importance some time later, at the beginning of the Jansenist controversy. Mauguin, a Jansenist, assembled the documents in his *Veterum auctorum qui IX saeculo de praedestinatione et gratia scripserunt opera et fragmenta plurima*

referring to their contributions (especially to Mauguin's and Sirmond's) and judging them in quite a biased manner, primarily according to their Jansenist and, respectively, Jesuit allegiances.)[5]

Much later, 19th-century scholars such as Schrörs[6] and Freystedt[7] provided additional, but incomplete information on the 9th-century predestination debate as a whole. Then, in the 20th century, Cappuyns,[8] Devisse[9] and Vielhaber[10] put forward more recent and valuable analyses that took into account also the

nunc primum in lucem edita (Paris, 1650) and *Vindiciarum praedestinationis et gratiae tomus posterior—Gotteschalcanae controversiae historica et chronica synopsis* (Paris, 1650). He did that as a reaction against the Jesuit Sirmond's publication of an anonymous book, the *Praedestinatus* (Paris, 1643), and of his *Historia praedestinatiana* (Paris, 1648), works that appeared soon after Jansenius' *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640) and hinted against Jansenius' exposition of Augustine's doctrine of grace. After the Jansenist Mauguin, another Jesuit, Cellot, used the materials published by both Sirmond and Mauguin in his *Historia Gotteschalci praedestinatiani et accurata controversiae per eum revocate disputatio in libros quinque distincta* (Paris, 1655). Later, Cardinal Noris, an Augustinian, compiled his *Historiae Gotthescalcanae synopsis*, published posthumously in his *Opera omnia*, vol. IV, Verona, Tumerman, 1732, cols. 682-718. For details on all these, see Lambot, *Introduction* [see n. 3], p. xx-xxii and É. Amann, *Prédestinatianisme*, in A. Vacant, E. Mangenot and É. Amann, eds. *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* XII-2, Paris, Letouzey et Ané, 1935, cols. 2804-2809.

[5] E.g. C.J. Hefele and H. Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles d'après les documents originaux*, vol. IV, Paris, Letouzey et Ané, 1911.

[6] Heinrich Schrörs, *Hinkmar Erzbischof von Reims: Sein Leben und seine Schriften*, Freiburg i. Br., Herder, 1884.

[7] Albert Freystedt, *Studien zu Gottschalks Leben und Lehre*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 18 (1898), p. 1-23, 161-82, 529-45.

[8] Maïeul Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée*, Bruxelles, Culture et civilisation, 1964.

[9] Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1]. Although I agree with Devisse's observations regarding the differences between northern and southern Carolingian theology (especially in its more nuanced version to be found in O'Meara) [see n. 1], I will also start from different premises when compared to his. For instance, I disagree with his view that the debate on predestination was primarily the consequence of the attempts of the episcopate to establish ecclesiastical order in the Carolingian realm—see Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. 1, p. 118-153, 187-279.

[10] Klaus Vielhaber, *Gottschalk der Sachse*, Bonn, Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1956.

texts edited by Lambot. However, the debate itself still played only a secondary part in all these studies, which were especially monographs on different personalities involved in the debate such as John Scot Eriugena, Hincmar of Rheims and Gottschalk of Orbais and provided only fragmentary information on the entire controversy. Moreover, there were many aspects on which these scholars disagreed.

Some of their ideas were later either emphasised or criticised in well-documented articles more recently written by David Ganz,[11] John Marenbon,[12] and Gangolf Schrimpf.[13] But, out of these articles, the last two are primarily theoretical, offering no historical overview of the main events since both John Marenbon and Gangolf Schrimpf concentrate on the philosophy of John Scot Eriugena. It is only the article of David Ganz that amply refers to the debate on predestination itself, but he is more interested in the political and social context of the controversy and less in its theological core, which, on the contrary, will make the object of the two articles that compose this study.

Another two more recent studies on Gottschalk that should be mentioned here are the ones by Marie-Luise Weber[14] and by Victor Genke and Francis X. Gumerlock.[15] Weber's study concentrates, nevertheless, only on Gottschalk's poems. As for the book by Genke and Gumerlock, it offers a comprehensive account of Gottschalk's life and views, a good survey of the existing lit-

[11] David Ganz, *The Debate on Predestination*, in *Charles the Bald: Court and Kingdom*, eds. Margaret T. Gibson and Janet L. Nelson, Aldershot, UK, Variorum, 1990, p. 283-303.

[12] John Marenbon, *John Scot and Carolingian Theology: From the 'De Praedestinatione', its Background and its Critics, to the 'Periphyseon'*, in *Charles the Bald…* [see n. 11], p. 303-326.

[13] Gangolf Schrimpf, *Der Beitrag des Johannes Scotus Eriugena zum Prädestinationsstreit*, in *Die Iren und Europa im früheren Mittelalter*, ed. Heinz Löwe, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1982, p. 819-66.

[14] Marie-Luise Weber, *Die Gedichte des Gottschalk von Orbais* (Lateinische Sprache und Literatur des Mittelalters, 27), Frankfurt and Berlin, Peter Lang, 1992.

[15] Victor Genke and Francis X. Gumerlock, *Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy: Texts Translated from The Latin* (Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, 47). Milwaukee, WI, Marquette University Press, 2010.

erature and translations of some of the texts that are relevant for the debate. But the entire theological debate is again rather briefly treated, in just a few pages.

While taking into account all these previous studies and intending to supply the missing information or to discuss the biased one in some of them, the present article and the complementary one that compose this study try to offer a chronological and as comprehensive as possible account of the debate itself while also taking into account the most recent scholarship. With this goal in view, the two articles will also suggest a few explanations for the development of the debate according to a few lines of research that will be briefly sketched here and developed further on.

Thus, the articles that compose the present study intend to point out how the idea of predestination was accounted for from different points of view and at different moments over a decade or more and how different types of discourse were applied to it for different purposes (sometimes theological and other times pastoral).

The two articles also intend to establish to what extent the participants in the debate read and relied upon Augustine's early or late works or even on some spurious texts. The possibility that not all participants had a proper knowledge of Augustine should be taken into account. My suggestion here is that, in fact, some of them may have read only fragments of Augustine's works in the *florilegia* available in their monasteries.

Moreover, besides the influence of Augustine, the two articles will also weigh the influence of some of Augustine's disciples such as Prosper of Aquitaine or Fulgentius of Ruspe, cited by different participants in the debate, who may not have actually read Augustine's works, but some of his disciples'.

Furthermore, in the second article, the *capitula* of the second Council of Orange (529) will be studied in comparison to those adopted at Valence (855) in order to establish the particular influence of Augustine's (and also of Caesarius of Arles') views within the Archbishopric of Lyons and the differences that such a comparison may reveal regarding the differences in Augustinian scholarship between North and South in the 9th-century Carolingian realm (see above, n. 1). But, for the moment, as noted above, this article will deal primarily with the northern regions of the Carolingian realm.

Gottschalk and the Beginnings of the Debate on Predestination

Gottschalk's views on double predestination and the reaction of his abbot, Hrabanus Maurus—the 'right' interpretation of Augustine at issue

Gottschalk of Orbais,[16] the son of Berno, a Saxon noble, was offered by his father as an oblate to the Benedictine Abbey of Fulda, where he studied with Hrabanus Maurus and met Walafrid Strabo and Lupus of Ferrières. When he became mature, Gottschalk was released, at his request, from all monastic obligations by the Synod of Mainz (829). However, at the appeal of his abbot, Hrabanus Maurus, Louis the Pious invalidated the decision.[17]

Gottschalk was thus forced to continue his monastic life, but moved to the monastery of Corbie, where he made friends with Ratramnus of Corbie and another monk called Gislemar. Later, he left Corbie for Orbais, in the Diocese of Soissons. Some time between 835 and 840, he was raised to priesthood by Rigbold, suffragan bishop of Rheims, who thus disregarded the rights of the bishop of Soissons.[18]

[16] Details on him in Ludwig Traube, *Introduction* to *Godescalci Carmina*, in *MGH Poetae latini aevi karolini* III, Berlin, Weidmann, 1886, p. 707-715; B. Lavaud, *La controverse sur la prédestination au IX^e siècle*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, É. Amann, Paris, Letouzey et Ané, 1935, cols. 2901-2935; Emmanuel Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination au IX^e siècle*, in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 116 (1937), p. 187-223 (189-190). The biographical information on Gottschalk provided here is selected according to its relevance for the predestination debate. More comprehensive biographical information on Gottschalk can be found in the introduction to the recent English translation of some texts related to the 9th-century predestination debate by Genke and Gumerlock, *Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy* [see n. 15].

[17] Traube, *Introduction* [see n. 16], p. 708; Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination* [see n. 16], p. 190.

[18] Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination* [see n. 16], p. 195. See also Michel Sot, *Un historien et son église au X^e siècle: Flodoard de Reims*. Paris, Fayard, 1993, p. 445: Gottschalk should have been ordained priest by the bishop of Soissons, in whose diocese Orbais was included. However, the monastery of Orbais had been founded by the archbishop of Rheims, who could use his own right to ordain Gottschalk.

In Corbie and Orbais, Gottschalk studied the works of Augustine and of Fulgentius of Ruspe, which had a great impact on his own work, especially with regard to the doctrine of gratuitous grace.[19] Thus, Gottschalk maintained that human nature corrupted after the Fall could not be restored otherwise than by the aid of divine grace.[20] According to Gottschalk, nobody should enjoy or trust free will, but the grace of God, an idea figuratively illustrated by the tree of life.[21]

In this, Gottschalk followed Augustine, who had maintained that liberty without grace was not liberty but arrogance.[22] Gottschalk also adopted Augustine's idea that *libertas* and *libertas voluntatis* were two different things—when used to sin, human will did not bring about liberty but transformed the man into a slave of sin; the ones who could not perform the right deeds were not free.[23] Gottschalk's conclusion was that only the aid of divine grace could restore the corrupted human will and direct it towards good, thus bringing real liberty about.[24] And all these were

[19] Cf. Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione*, in *Œuvres Théologiques et Grammaticales*… [see n. 3], p. 180-258 (185).

[20] Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione* [see n. 19], p. 185-186: '(...) uitiata uulnerata debilitata corrupta natura quia reuera creatori non potest incorrupta conferri nedum corrupta praeferri quod absit creatura, sed nec incorruptibilis qualis est in beatissimis angelis et quandoque per gratiam erit gratis in nobis.'

[21] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Responsa de diversis*, in *Œuvres Théologiques et Grammaticales*… [see n. 3], p. 130-179 (146-147): ' (…) nemo debet delectari neque fidere in libertate arbitrii sed in gratia dei quae per lignum uitae probatur figurari.'

[22] Augustine, *Epistula* 157.3.16, CSEL 44, ed. A. Goldbacher, Vienna – Leipzig, Tempsky – Freytag, 1904, p. 465: 'libertas sine Dei gratia non est libertas sed contumacia.'

[23] Augustine, *Enchiridion* 9.30, CCSL 46, ed. E. Evans, Turnhout, Brepols, 1969, p. 65-66: 'Nam libero arbitrio male utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum. (...) Quae cum uera sit, qualis quaeso potest serui addicti esse libertas nisi quando eum peccare delectat? (...) quomodo quisquam de libero arbitrio bono gloriatur opere qui nondum est liber ad operandum bene, nisi se uana superbia inflatus extollat, quam cohibet apostolus dicens: *Gratia salui facti estis per fidem*?' (cf. Eph. 2, 8).

[24] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Responsa de diversis* [see n. 21], p. 153: '(…) ait sanctus Augustinus quod quantum facultatis ad uidendum habet sanus oculus in corpore tantum facultatis et possibilitatis ad bene faciendum habet per dei gratiam liberatum liberum arbitrium in anima mente vel corde. Attamen sicut oculus etiam sanissimus in tenebris positus absque

also in line with Paul's *Epistles*: *Ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas* (II Cor. 3, 17), *Eramus naturae filii irae* (Eph. 2, 3), *Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia dei* (...) (Rom. 7, 24-5), *Gratia salvi facti estis* (Eph. 2, 8) and *Sufficit tibi gratia mea* (II Cor. 12, 9), often referred to throughout Gottschalk's text.

Gottschalk insisted that divine grace was greater than human nature[25] and, just like Augustine, he explained salvation in terms of divine omnipotence, the necessity of grace and the insufficient value of human merit without divine mercy.[26] He also endorsed Augustine's view that justice came from grace and not from nature since otherwise the passion of Christ would be emptied of its value.[27]

But Gottschalk's name was to be soon related not only to the issue of gratuitous grace, but also to that of double predestination, which aroused one of the most heated theological debates of the 9th century. Gottschalk's doctrine of double predestination (of the elect to eternal life and of the reprobate to eternal death) was apparently restricting not only the salvific will of God but also the efficacy of the passion of Christ only to the elect. This view was considered particularly dangerous by Gottschalk's

adminiculo lucis extrinsecae nihil potest cernere, sic procul dubio sine dei gratia et auxilio liberum arbitrium nil boni potest facere.' (cf. Augustine: *De natura et gratia* 26.29, in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* [Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 21], eds. G. de Plinval and J. de la Tullaye, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1966, p. 298).

[25] Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione* [see n. 19], p. 184: '(...) gratia naturam esse maiorem (...)'.

[26] Augustine, *Epistula* 214.4, CSEL 57, ed. A. Goldbacher, Vienna, Tempsky, 1911, p. 383: '(...) ne quisquam dicat meritis operum suorum uel meritis orationum suarum uel meritis fidei suae sibi traditam dei gratiam et putetur uerum esse, quod illi haeretici dicunt, gratiam dei secundum merita nostra dari, quod omnino falsissimum est, non quia nullum est meritum uel bonum piorum uel malum impiorum—alioquin quo modo iudicabit Deus mundum ?—sed misericordia et gratia dei conuertit hominem (...)' (cf. Iac. 1, 17: *Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a patre luminum*). Quoted in Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione* [see n. 19], p. 188 (cf. Io. 15, 5: *Sine me nihil potestis facere*).

[27] Augustine: *De natura et gratia*, 2.2 [see n. 24], p. 248: '(...) <si per naturam iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est!> si autem Christus non gratis mortus est, ergo omnis humana natura iustificari et redimi ab ira dei iustissima, hoc est a uindicta, nullo modo potest nisi per fidem et sacramentum sanguinis Christi.' Quoted in Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione* [see n. 19], p. 187 (cf. Gal. 2, 21).

contemporaries especially because he was presenting it as inspired by Augustine's late, anti-Pelagian works: *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426), *De correptione et gratia* (426), *De predestinatione sanctorum* (428) or *De dono perseverantiae* (428) extensively quoted in his work.

In fact, Gottschalk also referred to earlier works of Augustine such as *De libero arbitrio* (388-391), *Enarationes in Psalmos* (392), *Tractatus in Ioannis evangelium* (407/8-414), *De natura et gratia* (413) as well as to many of Augustine's *Epistles* and also to *De civitate Dei* (413-425). In general, Gottschalk adopted the Augustinian idea of *duo populi in una plebe*, the ones who lived *secundum Deum* and the ones who lived *secundum hominem*, and maintained that the former were predestined to eternal life and the latter to eternal death.[28]

Moreover, Gottschalk insisted that the doctrine of double predestination was actually inspired by Paul's own views. Thus, according to Gottschalk, Paul's assertion: *qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri* (I Tim.2, 4), referred only to the elect, to those who were effectively saved by the will and grace of God. Here Gottschalk quoted and commented upon other Scriptural passages as well, always discussing the issue in connection to divine immutability and omnipotence: *Non reppulit Deus plebem suam quam praescivit* (Rom. 11, 2) and *Cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat* (Rom. 9, 18).

Claiming that Christ did not die for the reprobate, who were not reconciled with God through his death, Gottschalk provided again a list of quotations from Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* (Rom. 8, 31-2, Rom. 5, 8-9 and Rom. 5, 10) and maintained that the words of the Apostle conveyed by these passages could not refer to the reprobate, since they were not given *omnia bona* and

[28] Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 15.1, ed. E. Hoffmann, CSEL 40, Prague and Vienna, Tempsky, 1900, vol. II, p. 58: 'Arbitror tamen satis nos iam fecisse magnis et difficillimis quaestionibus de initio uel mundi uel animae uel ipsius generis humani, quod in duo genera distribuimus, unum eorum, qui secundum hominem, alterum eorum qui secundum Deum uiuunt; quas etiam mystice apellamus ciuitates duas, hoc est duas societates hominum, quarum est una quae praedestinata est in aeternum regnare cum Deo, altera aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolo.' Quoted in Gottschalk of Orbais, *De praedestinatione* [see n. 19], p. 213.

were not saved from the wrath of God through the resurrection of Christ.[29]

All these views maintained by Gottschalk seem to have been well known by his former abbot, Hrabanus Maurus. The latter even wrote a small treatise on predestination and sent it to Bishop Noting of Verona together with an explanatory letter in 840.[30] Hrabanus warned Noting about Gottschalk's tenets and about the danger of their diffusion in upper Italy, even if he did not mention Gottschalk's name, but just spoke generally about *vaniloqui* who were preaching unorthodox creeds.[31]

Against these *vaniloqui*, Hrabanus asserted the divine universal salvific will, the fact that Christ died for all and that the good were saved according to their good deeds, accomplished with the help of divine grace, while the evil were punished because of their evil deeds, brought about by their liberty. Hrabanus insisted that God was not the cause of sin or damnation—God did not abandon the sinners, but the sinners abandoned God and shifted from good to evil out of their own will.[32]

Hrabanus also distinguished between divine prescience and predestination. As he explained, God had foreseen the good among the sinful humanity after the Fall[33] and predestined them to eternal life by divine mercy and he had also forseen the evil (the example of Judas) and judged them according to their deeds, by divine justice, but did not predestine them to evil and eternal

[29] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Responsa de diversis* [see n. 21], p. 158: 'Non autem eis cum illo omnia bona donauit. Non ergo pro illis eum tradidit. (…) Non erunt autem reprobi salui ab ira per ipsum. Non ergo Christus mortuus est pro reprobis. (...) Non erunt autem salui in uita ipsius (...) Non ergo sunt reprobi reconciliati deo per mortem filii eius.' (cf. Rom. 8, 31-2: 'Si deus pro nobis quis contra nos? Qui proprio etiam filio suo non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donavit?'; Rom. 5, 8-9: 'Christus pro nobis mortuus est, multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum'; and Rom. 5, 10: 'Si enim cum inimici essemus reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius').

[30] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola V ad Notingum cum libro de Praedestinatione Dei*, PL 112, cols. 1530-1553.

[31] *Ibid.*, col. 1531.

[32] *Ibid.*, col. 1532: 'Non enim relicti sunt a Deo ut relinquerent Deum, sed relinquerent eum et relicti sunt, et ex bono in malum propria voluntate mutati sunt (...)'.

[33] *Ibid.*, col. 1533: '(...) in damnabili massa praescivit.'

death.[34] Trying to account for divine omnipotence in the context of this difference between prescience and predestination, Hrabanus used as final argument the idea that it was not given to human beings to understand the will of God.[35]

Warned by Hrabanus' letter about the 'unorthodox creeds' regarding double predestination, Noting must have been able to easily recognize them when hearing them exposed. And the occasion appeared in 845-846, when he probably encountered Gottschalk at the court of Count Eberhard of Friuli, the son-in-law of Louis the Pious. Before 840, Gottschalk had left the monastery of Orbais without permission and had gone on pilgrimage to Rome. On his way back, he stopped at the court of the count and probably presented his views on double predestination in front of the count and of his guest, Bishop Noting.[36] And this may have been the actual beginning of the 9th-century debate on double predestination.

Soon afterwards, in 846, Hrabanus wrote another letter, this time to Eberhard of Friuli. This letter referred specifically to Gottschalk and his doctrine of predestination,[37] quoted extensively from the works of Augustine on divine grace in order to define their 'real meaning',[38] and warned the count that the new doctrine on double predestination was dangerous for the believers since it could discourage their meritorious acts. According to Hrabanus, from the idea that God's election was immutable, believers could conclude either that their good deeds were useless

[34] *Ibid.*, col. 1548: 'Diximus namque de damnabili humani generis massa Deum non meritis, quos electione gratiae praedestinavit ad vitam: caeteros, qui judicio iustitiae eius ab hac gratia efficiuntur expertes, praescivisse tantum proprio vitio perituros, non ut perirent praedestinasse (...) quos in opera impietatis et mortis ruituros praescivit, non praeordinavit, nec impulit (...)'.

[35] *Ibid.*, cols. 1547-1548: '(...) iudicia Dei comprehendere non vales, nec valebis (...)'; 'Scire non datur quod supra nos est.'

[36] Traube, *Introduction* [see n. 16], p. 711 ; Lavaud, *La controverse...* [see n. 16], col. 2902; Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination* [see n. 16], p. 195-196.

[37] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola ad Eberhardum comitem*, in *MGH Epistolae* V, ed. Ernst Dümmler, Berlin, Weidmann, 1899 (reprint 1974), p. 481-487 (481): '(...) quendam sciolum, nomine Gotescalcum, apud vos manere, qui dogmatizat quod praedestinatio Dei omnem hominem ita constringat (...)'.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 482: '(...) quae ibi recte scripta sunt, in pravum sensum abducere conabantur.'

unless they were predestined to eternal life or that nothing wrong could happen to them in case they performed evil deeds if they were predestined to eternal life.[39]

Thus, Hrabanus' letters seem to have marked not only the beginning of the debate on double predestination, but also the point when 9th-century scholars started 'opposing Augustine to Augustine', namely quoting Augustine in order to prove different or even opposed views, while each participant in the debate claimed that his interpretation was the correct one.

The Council of Mainz (848) and Gottschalk's Confessio brevior

When Gottschalk returned from Rome, he appeared in front of the Council of Mainz (848),[40] where he was asked to present his confession of faith, known as the *Confessio brevior*, which asserted double predestination: '*Credo et confiteor deum omnipotentem et incommutabilem praescisse et praedestinasse angelos sanctos et homines electos ad uitam gratis aeternam, et ipsum diabolum caput omnium daemoniorum cum omnibus angelis suis apostaticis et cum ipsis quoque uniuersis hominibus reprobis membris uidelicet suis propter praescita certissime ipsorum propria futura mala merita praedestinasse pariter per iustissimum iudicium suum in mortem merito sempiternam* (...)'.[41]

In support of his assertion of double predestination, Gottschalk referred this time to Scriptural excerpts mainly from the Gospel of John such as *Princeps mundi huius iam iudicatus est* (Io. 14, 11), *Qui autem non credit, iam iudicatus est* (Io. 3, 18) or *Oues meae uocem meam audiunt et cognosco eas et sequuntur me et ego uitam aeternam do eis et non peribunt in aeternum et non rapiet eas quisquam de manu mea* (Io 10, 27-8). He also provided complementary commentaries from Augustine's *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* such as: *iudicio ignis aeterni inreuocabiliter destinatus est* (95.4), *populus praeparatus ad iram dei, damnandus cum diabolo* (14.8) or

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 483: 'Quid mihi necesse est pro salute mea et vita aeterna laborare? quia si bonum fecero, et praedestinatus ad vita non sum, nihil mihi prodest; si autem malum agero, nihil mihi obest, quia praedestinatio Dei me facit ad vitam aeternam pervenire.'

[40] See *MGH Concilia* III, ed. Wilfrid Hartmann. Hannover, Hahn, 1984, p. 179-184.

[41] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio brevior*, in *Œuvres Théologiques et Grammaticales*... [see n. 3], p. 52-54.

Non perdunt nisi ad interitum praedestinatos (48.6).[42] Gottschalk also referred to fragments from other patristic authorities such as Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Iob*, Fulgentius of Ruspe's *Ad Monimum* and especially Isidore of Seville's *Sententiae*.[43]

In 848, Gottschalk seems to have also written a work dedicated to Hrabanus (Archbishop of Mainz since 847), in which he attempted to refute the latter's 'errors' in the treatise sent to Noting,[44] namely those referring to Gottschalk's (and Augustine's) ideas regarding double predestination,[45] divine will,[46] human free will (against the Pelagians)[47] and the redemption only of the elect through the passion of Christ.[48]

On account of the *Confessio brevior*, the Council of Mainz, assembled in the presence of king Louis the German, condemned Gottschalk for his views.[49] He was expelled from the kingdom of

[42] Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV*, ed. A. Mayer, CCSL 36, Turnhout, Brepols, 1954, p. 568, 146, 415, quoted in Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio brevior* [see n. 41], p. 52-53.

[43] Isidore of Seville, *Sententiae* 2.6.1, PL 83, col. 606: 'Gemina est praedestinatio siue electorum ad requiem, siue reproborum ad mortem', quoted in Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio brevior* [see n. 41], p. 54.

[44] Fragments copied by Hincmar of Rheims in *Fragmenta omnia quae exstant Libelli per Gotteschalcum Rabano, arhiepiscopo Moguntino in placito moguntinae oblati, ano 848*, PL 121, cols. 365-368.

[45] *Ibid.*, col. 368: 'Ego Gotteschalcus credo et confiteor, profiteor et testificor (...) quod gemina est praedestinatio sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem. Quia sicut Deus incommutabilis ante mundi constitutionem omnes electos suos incommutabiliter per gratuitam gratiam suam praedestinavit ad vitam aeternam; similiter omnino omnes reprobos qui in die iudicii damnabuntur propter ipsorum mala merita, idem ipse incommutabilis Deus per iustum iudicium suum incommutabiliter praedestinavit ad mortem merito sempiternam.'

[46] *Ibid.*, cols. 365-366: 'Omnes, inquit, quos vult Deus salvos fieri sine dubitatione salvantur: nec possunt salvari, nisi quos Deus vult salvos fieri (...) quia Deus noster omnia quaecunque voluit fecit.'

[47] *Ibid.*, col. 365: 'De quo videlicet libero arbitrio quod Ecclesiae Christi tenendum sit atque credendum, cum a caeteris catholicis Patribus evidenter sit Deo gratias disputatum, tum praecipue contra Pelagianos et Coelestianos a beato Augustino plenius et uberius diversis in opusculis, et maxime in Hypomnesticon esse cognoscitur inculcatum.'

[48] *Ibid.*, col. 367. 'Illos omnes impios et peccatores, pro quibus idem Filius Dei nec corpus assumpsit, nec orationem, nec dico sanguinem fudit: neque pro eis ullo modo crucifixus fuit'.

[49] *Annales Bertiniani* (849), in *Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte*, vol. 6, ed. Reinhold Rau, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

Louis the German and committed to his metropolitan, Hincmar of Rheims.[50] Hrabanus also wrote a letter to Hincmar in order to warn him about the wandering monk, his journey from Italy to Mainz and his condemnation due to his dangerous tenets.[51]

The Council of Quierzy I (849)

Hincmar sent Gottschalk to Bishop Rothad of Soissons,[52] who was supposed to bring him to be judged at the Council of Quierzy,

1992, p. 72: 'Godesscalcus Gallus quidam, monasterii Orbacensis parochiae Suessonicae monachus et presbyter, scientia tumidus, quibusdam superstitionibus deditus, Italiam speciae religionis adgressus (...) in praesentia Hludowici Germanorum regis episcopali concilio detectus atque conuictus (...)'

[50] *Annales Fuldenses* (848), in *Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte*, vol. 7, ed. Reinhold Rau, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992, p. 36: 'Gotescalcus quoque quidam presbyter, de praedestinatione Dei praue sentiens et tam bonos ad uitam quam malos ad mortem perpetuam ineuitabiliter a Deo praedestinatos esse adfirmans in conuentu episcoporum rationabiliter, ut plurimis uisum est, conuictus et ad proprium episcopum Ingmarum Remis transmissus est; prius tamen iuramento confirmans, ne in regnum Hludowici ultra rediret.' See also *Annales Xantenses* (848), in *Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte*... [see n. 49], p. 350: 'Eodem anno Ludewicus rex habuit conuentum populi apud Magontiam, et secta quaedam in synodo episcoporum inlata est a quibusdam monachis de praedestinatione omnipotentis Dei. Qui conuicti et coram omni populo contumeliis uerberum affecti reuersi sunt in Galliam (...)'

[51] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola synodalis*, PL 112, cols. 1574-1576, preserved by Hincmar in his *De praedestinatione* II, PL 125, cols. 55-474 (84-85): 'Notum sit dilectioni vestrae quod quidam gyrovagus monachus, nomine Gothescalc, qui se asserit sacerdotem in vestra parochia ordinatum, de Italia venit ad nos Moguntiam, novas superstitiones et noxiam doctrinam de praedestinatione Dei introducens, et populos in errorem mittens: dicens quod praedestinatio Dei, sicut in bono sit ita et in malo; et tales sint in hoc mundo quidam, qui propter praedestinationem Dei quae eos cogat in mortem ire, non possint ab errore et peccato se corrigere, quasi Deus eos fecisset ab initio incorrigibiles esse et paene obnoxios in interitum ire. Hanc ergo opinionem nuper in synodo apud Moguntiam habita ab eo audientes et incorrigibilem eum reperientes, annuente atque iubente piisimo rege nostro Ludovico, decrevimus eum cum perniciosa sua doctrina damnatum mittere ad vos, quatenus eum recludatis in vestra parochia, unde primum inordinate recessit, et non sinatis eum amplius errorem docere et seducere populum christianum (...)' (Hincmar's short treatise *De praedestinatione* I can also be found in PL 125, cols. 49-56).

[52] Letter of Hincmar of Rheims, copied by Flodoard in his *Historia Remensis ecclesiae*, 3.21, ed. J. Heller and G. Waitz, *MGH Scriptores* XIII.

convoked by Hincmar in 849.[53] In the presence of King Charles the Bald this time, Gottschalk was again condemned, degraded from priesthood, flogged, forced to burn his own writings and imprisoned for life in the monastery of Hautvillers,[54] in the Diocese of Rheims. According to the final sentence adopted at Quierzy I, as reproduced in J. D. Mansi's edition of the councils, Gottschalk was also compelled to remain silent on all theological questions from that time onwards.[55] However, despite that, Gottschalk seems to have managed to send a work on predestination to Gislemar of Corbie, his old friend.[56]

Hincmar's Ad reclusos et simplices—pastoral discourse and Pelagian sources inadvertently used to refute Gottschalk's views and to establish the 'right' interpretation of Augustine

Also in 849, while being concerned with the influence of Gottschalk's ideas among the monks and priests in his diocese and with the possible 'threat' they represented for the Church as an institution, Hincmar decided to write a long pastoral letter,[57] *Ad reclu-*

Hannover: Hahn, 1881, p. 514: 'Rothado Suessonico (...) pro recipiendo et adducendo ad iudicium Gothescalco.'

[53] *MGH Concilia* III [see n. 40], p. 194-199.

[54] Hincmar seems not to have trusted Rothad of Soissons enough and preferred to imprison Gottschalk at Hautvillers, to have him in his power: Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola II ad Nicolaum Papam*, PL 126, col. 43: 'Postea autem a Belgicae, Rhemorum ac Galliarum provinciarum episcopis auditus, et inventus haereticus, quia resipisci a sua pravitate non voluit, ne aliis noceret qui sibi prodesse nolebat, iudicio praefatarum provinciarum episcoporum, in nostra parochia, quoniam Rothadus, de cuius parochia erat, illi nesciebat resistere, et novitates amans timebatur a nobis ne disceret prava sentire (...) monasteriali custodiae mancipatus est (...)' See also Hincmar, *De praedestinatione* II, PL 125 [see n. 51], col. 84. Cf. Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination* [see n. 16], p. 201.

[55] J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, Venice, Antonius Zatta, 1757-1798, vol. XIV, col. 921: 'Frater Gotescalc, sacrosanctum sacerdotalis misterii officium (...) perpetuo interdictum (...) ergastulo retrudi auctoritate episcopali decernimus et (...) perpetuum silentium ori tuo virtute aeterni verbi imponimus.'

[56] Cf. Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices in Remensi parochia*, ed. Wilhelm Gundlach, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 10 (1889), p. 258-310 (261) and Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 135, n. 98. It is, nevertheless, impossible to identify this work among Gottschalk's writings published by Lambot in 1945.

[57] Allusions to this letter in Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola ad Hincmarum*, in *MGH Epp.* V... [see n. 37], p. 487-489. It was discovered by

sos et simplices. The work can be divided, according to Jean Devisse, into six distinct parts:[58] a sort of preface containing Gottschalk's doctrine and some words of encouragement for the clerics in his diocese,[59] long paraphrases of texts extracted from Gregory the Great's *Moralia*,[60] the presentation of Hincmar's own doctrine,[61] the authorities cited in support of this doctrine,[62] a passage that does not refer to predestination, starting with the words *De videndo autem Deo* ...[63] and, finally, a long conclusion on the issue of predestination.[64]

Before the end of 849, Hincmar seems to have already been in possession of three writings attributed to Gottschalk:[65] *Tomus ad Gislemarum*, *Libellus ad Rabanum*, now lost but apparently preserved to some extent in Hincmar's quotations, and a third work—in Hincmar's words, *quantitate parvum sed impietate maximum*—probably the *Confessio brevior* presented at the councils of Mainz and Quierzy I.[66]

Adopting Hrabanus' distinction between prescience and predestination and disregarding the resemblance of Gottschalk's and Augustine's views, Hincmar extracted from Gottschalk's writings the ideas he considered most dangerous and presented them to the clerks and monks in his diocese to warn them against Gottschalk's

Wilhelm Gundlach in a manuscript of the university library in Leiden and published in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* [see n. 56 for details].

[58] Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 134-135.

[59] Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 258-264.

[60] *Ibid*., p. 264-270.

[61] *Ibid*., p. 269-270.

[62] *Ibid*., p. 270-295—Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*; pseudo-Jerome, *De induratione cordis pharaonis*; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula calumniantium Gallorum*, *Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianorum*; John Chrysostom, *Ad Theodorum lapsum*; Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, etc.

[63] *Ibid*., p. 295-296.

[64] *Ibid*., p. 297-309.

[65] Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 106.

[66] Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 261-62: 'De quibus perversitatibus scilicet suis et scripta illius suscepi: unum quidem thomum a confratribus nostris oblatum, quem ad quendam Gislemarum, Corbeie monasterii monachum, scripsit (...) Alterum autem quem contra Rhabanum venerabilem archiepiscopum (...) Tertium quoque thomulum quantitate parvum, sed impietate maximum ab illo ipso mihi oblatum suscepi.'

doctrine and to refute it. In Hincmar's view, Gottschalk had confused divine prescience and predestination and had taught about divine gratuitous grace without free will, about the redemption through the passion of Christ only of the elect and about double predestination and restricted salvific will of God.[67]

Hincmar supported this refutation of Gottschalk's ideas with substantial quotations from the works of Hrabanus Maurus, Alcuin, Gregory the Great and also from the Pelagian text *De induratione cordis pharaonis*,[68] attributed by both Hrabanus and Hincmar[69] to Jerome. The most important Patristic source in Hincmar's letter is, nevertheless, Augustine, but Hincmar's interpretation of Augustine is very different from Gottschalk's. This situation could be somewhat explained by the fact that Hincmar (just like Hrabanus formerly) considered the apocryphal *Hypomnesticon* a work of Augustine's[70] and quoted from it substantially

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 261: '(...) confundens praescientiam et praedestinationem Dei, docens praedestinatos ad poenam, quam nullus praedestinatus (...) Isdem etiam sic dogmatizat sine libero arbitrio gratiam (...) Docet etiam, quod passio Christi non pro totius mundi salute fuerit celebrata (...) docetque duos populos: unum praedestinatum ad poenam, alterum ad gloriam (...).'

[68] The treatise, referring primarily to the fragment *induratum que est cor Pharaonis et non audivit eos sicut praeceperat Dominus* (Ex. 7, 13), is considered to have been written either by Pelagius or by someone from his circle—see Germain Morin, *Un traité pélagien inédit du commencement du cinquième siècle*, in *Revue bénédictine*, 26 (1909), p. 163-188—and circulated in Gaul under the influence of the Irish monks; cf. Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 138. See also F.G. Nuvolone, *Problèmes d'une nouvelle édition du 'De induratione cordis pharaonis' attribué à Pélage*, in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 26 (1980), p. 105-117 (115-117).

[69] Hincmar of Rheims, *De praedestinatione* II... [see n. 51], cols. 93-4, 106, 114, 116-7, 173.

[70] *Ibid.*, col. 73. Hincmar seems to have received one more copy of this treatise from Hrabanus Maurus later, in 850. Coming from such an authority, the treatise gained in importance and Hincmar continued to defend its views also in his later works. The author of the *Hypomnesticon* is still unknown. Due to the moderate Augustinian character of the *Hypomnesticon*, G. de Plinval, in *Pélage, sa vie, ses écrits et sa réforme*, Lausanne, 1943, p. 371-372, n.1, considered that the text was written by one of the disciples of Prosper of Aquitaine. Also cf. Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 136-137. J.E. Chisholm asserts that the *Hypomnesticon* is the work of Prosper himself—see John Edward Chisholm, *The Pseudo-augustinian Hypomnesticon against the Pelagians and Celestians* (Paradosis, 20). Fribourg, Fribourg University Press, 1967, vol. 1, *Introduction*, p. 211. This is also accepted as a probability, but not as a certainty by

to defend his own views and to refute Gottschalk's.[71] It was only later in the debate that the paternity of this treatise was seriously questioned, as Hincmar himself noted, by Florus of Lyons and Prudentius of Troyes.[72]

Moreover, in *Ad reclusos et simplices*, Hincmar quoted only once one of the late anti-Pelagian works of Augustine,[73] so influential for Gottschalk, and not even one of the earlier works of Augustine quoted by Gottschalk such as *De libero arbitrio* or *Enchiridion*. Hincmar and Gottschalk could, thus, express opposed views while both claiming to rely on the authority of Augustine.

It may happen that, at the beginning of the controversy, Hincmar did not know Augustine's late works. Apparently, these works were not available in Rheims at that time. Hincmar started to improve the library as late as 855-60 and only towards the end of the debate, when he was writing his second treatise on predestination, Hincmar seems to have had all the books quoted by Gottschalk copied in the scriptorium of Rheims.[74]

A. Elberti—see Arturo Elberti, *Prospero di Aquitania: Teologo e discepolo*. Roma, Edizioni Dehoniane, 1999, p. 31. On the use of the *Hypomnesticon* during the 9th-century debate on predestination, see also Bernhard Blumenkranz, *La survie médiévale de saint Augustin à travers ses apocryphes*, in *Augustinus Magister: Congrès international augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1954*. Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1954, vol. II, p. 1003-1018 (1015-1017).

[71] Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 270-3. It seems that the text circulated primarily in the North of the Carolingian Empire, sometimes under the influence of the 'Scots' (Irish), just like the *De induratione cordis pharaonis*, while in the South it was received with suspicion because of its non-conformity to the doctrine of Augustine. Boulogne, Orléans and Köln seem to have been the main centres of distribution of the manuscript in the 9th century. Cf. Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 137.

[72] Hincmar of Rheims, *De praedestinatione* II… [see n. 51], col. 120: Prudentius noticed that the *Hypomnesticon* was referred to neither in Augustine's *Retractationes* nor in Possidius' *Indiculum de gratia Dei*; moreover, it had a different doctrine and a different style.

[73] Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 10.19, in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 24), eds. Jean Chéné and Jacques Pintard, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1962, p. 522: '(…) praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio (…) gratia vero est ipsius praedestinationis effectus.' Quoted in Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 299.

[74] Devisse, *Hincmar Archevêque de Reims* [see n. 1], vol. I, p. 217-20.

Even if Hincmar seems to have been acquainted with some passages from *De civitate Dei* and especially with Augustine's idea that evil is not a substance, that it does not subsist in itself[75] (an idea which would become an important issue later in the debate), it seems that, at the beginning of the debate, besides quoting the Pelagian *De induratione cordis pharaonis*, Hincmar took indeed his ideas on predestination primarily from the *Hypomnesticon*,[76] as it can be observed in his letter *Ad reclusos et simplices*: divine predestination was only for good; God only condemned the ones who abandoned him; he was not responsible for the damnation of the reprobate, he only foreknew the sins without predestining them,[77] prescience was possible without predestination, but predestination without prescience was not possible,[78] Adam freely relinquished his freedom,[79] Christ died for all and wanted all to be saved.[80]

Hincmar relied in general on the teachings found in the *Hypomnesticon* in order to underline a supposed misunderstanding (that he claimed to have found in Gottschalk's *Tomus ad Gislemarum*) of Scriptural excerpts like *Nonne ego vos duodecim elegi, et unus ex vobis diabolus est* (Io. 6, 71) or *Nemo periit, nisi filius perditionis* (Io. 17, 12) referring to the predestination of Judas.[81] Quoting from the *Hypomnesticon*, Hincmar insisted that Judas' damnation happened due to his own wicked deed, not to God's predestination. God only foresaw his betrayal and his avarice without necessitating them.[82]

[75] Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 298: 'Quia Deus bonorum auctor est, non malorum, praedestinatio Dei semper in bono est (...)' and p. 303: 'Sed absit hoc a bono et benigno divino proposito, quia Deus malum non fecit, quoniam malum nec est nec subsistit, quia nec substantiam habet nec substantia est nec ex Deo est, sed a diabolo inventus est morbus boni in bona creatura Dei, quia, sicut scriptum est, *omnia opera Dei erant bona valde* (Gen. 1, 31), et homo bonus a Deo factus, sed a diabolo per malum inmorbatus (...).'

[76] Cf. also O'Meara, *Eriugena* [see n. 1], p. 33, 36.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 298: 'Praescientia autem dei in bonis et in malis intellegenda est, quia praescit Deus mala, quae futura sunt, non autem praedestinat.'

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 298: 'Et praescientia potest esse sine praedestinatione, praedestinatio autem sine praescientia esse non potest (...)'.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 269: '(...) Adam primus, diabolo suadente, per arbitrii libertatem ab inmortalitate decideret (...)'.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 292: '(…) Christus pro omnibus mortuus est, qui omnes homines vult salvari (…)'.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 271.

[82] Pseudo-Augustine, *Hypomnesticon*, PL 45, col. 1661: 'Ubi ergo commemoratio operum eius malorum a sancto fit spiritu in psalmis, pri-

Furthermore, in this respect, Hincmar referred to another two Scriptural passages also used by Gottschalk in his works: *Ite in ignem aeternum, quem praeparavit pater meus diabolo et angelis eius* (Mt. 25, 41) and *Venite, benedicti patris mei, percipite regnum paratum vobis ab origine mundi* (Mt. 25, 34). Quoting again from the *Hypomnesticon*,[83] Hincmar asserted once more that predestination was never mentioned with reference to the reprobate, but only to the elect, since the eternal fire was made for the devil and for the fallen angels and not for humans, while heaven was made for the elect. The latter could be predestined *ab origine mundi* but the reprobate could not. Hincmar insisted that those who perished had deserted God and were damned according to their lack of faith and voluntary adherence to evil.[84]

Gottschalk's Confessio prolixior

In response to Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices* and despite the interdiction to express his views on doctrinal matters, Gottschalk wrote his *Confessio prolixior*,[85] a more detailed explanation of his

usquam esset, praescitus est, non factus, quod talis adversus filium Dei futurus esset; si enim talis factus esset, inculpabilis esset et Dei opificio reputaretur, non Iudae. Iniuste etiam in eum prolata dampnatio esset. Sed absit hoc a summae bono iudice, auctore omnium bonorum, Deo, dampnatore vero cunctorum malorum, qui malum Iudam, ut praedixi, praescivit, non fecit'. Quoted in Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 271.

[83] *Ibid.*, PL 45, col. 1662: '(...) peccatores in malis propriis, antequam essent in mundo, praescitos esse tantum, non praedestinatos (...).' Quoted in Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 272-273.

[84] Hincmar of Rheims, *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices* [see n. 56], p. 272: '(...) quia et electos praedestinavit ad regnum et regnum aeternum praedestinavit electis; reprobos autem propria voluntate per liberii arbitrii libertatem divina praescientia non praedestinavit ad poenam, quia Deus nec ad ignem aeternum hominem fecit, nec ignem aeternum propter hominem, sed propter diabolum et angelos eius, nec alius in ignem vadit aeternum de ratione dumtaxat utentibus, nisi qui deserit Deum aut per incredulitatem aut per apostasiam et adheret diabolo, propter quem factus est et cui paratus est ignis aeternus (...)'.

[85] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio prolixior*, in *Œuvres Théologiques et Grammaticales...* [see n. 3], p. 55-78. *Confessio prolixior* seems to have been written, according to M. Cappuyns, between *Ad reclusos et simplices*, which does not mention it at all, and the letter of Hincmar to Hrabanus, where it is mentioned—cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 106, n. 1.

position: God foreknew everything and the predestination to good was of two sorts: to the good of grace, which was gratuitous, and to the good of justice, which punished the evil/sin foreknown.[86] Gottschalk accepted that God foresaw the evil deeds of the sinners[87] but he did not accept any distinction between prescience (or foreknowledge) and predestination,[88] since that could introduce a principle of mutability in God, an idea which was unacceptable for him,[89] the follower of Augustine's teachings.

For Gottschalk, the immutable identity of divine prescience and divine predestination was the central fact of the dispute[90] and he supported this idea by quoting passages from the Scriptures such as *fecisti quae sunt futura* (Is. 45, 11), *qui non est inuentus in libro uitae scriptus missus est in stagnum ignis* (Rev. 20, 15) and *Non reppulit deus plebem suam quam praesciuit* (Rom. 11, 2) or from Augustine's *De dono perseverantiae*.[91] The passage from Isidore of Seville's *Sententiae*: *gemina est praedestinatio*, which Gottschalk only

[86] *Ibid*., p. 55-56: 'Credo siquidem atque confiteor praescisse te ante saecula quaecunque erant futura siue bona siue mala, praedestinasse uero tantummodo bona—bona autem a te praedestinata bifariam sunt tuis a fidelibus indagata, immo te reuelante illis euidenter constat esse intimata, id est in gratiae beneficia et iustitiae simul iudicia (...)'.

[87] *Ibid*., p. 61: '(…) quos praescisti per ipsorum propriam miseriam in damnabilibus perseueraturos esse peccatis illos profecto tanquam iustissimus iudex praedestinasti ad interitum iuste ac merito satis, et non modo praedestinasti uerum etiam praedestinando iam utique destinasti.'

[88] *Ibid*., p. 56-57: '(...) praescisse et predestinasse te mox absque ullo scilicet interuallo utpote simul et semel ante saecula, tam cuncta quam singula opera tua (...)'; see also p. 60: '(...) non modo praescitos uerum etiam praedestinatos (...)'

[89] *Ibid*., p. 59: '(...) sic a te praesumit dicere praedicta ut sint quidem praescita sed nullo modo praefinita, fac illum quaeso diligenter attendere quam sit contrarius ueritati quamque noxiae faveat falsitati, dum te tam temerarie subicit mutabilitati tamque uariae et inconstanti subdere non timet instabilitati (...)'.

[90] *Ibid*., p. 57: 'Absit ergo ut inter praescientiam et praedestinationem operum tuorum ullum uel momenti quilibet catholicorum tuorum suspicetur interuallum fuisse, dum omnia quae uoluisti te legit uel audit creditque simul fecisse, praesertim cum prius omnino nihil in effectu feceris quam incomparabiliter futura praescieris et ea sempiterno consilio praedestinando disposueris.' See also p. 61-62: 'in praedestinatione quam disposuisti incommutabiliter inretractabili praeordinatione.' Cf. Aegerter, *Gottschalk et le problème de la prédestination* [see n. 16], p. 218.

[91] A u g u s t i n e, *De dono perseverantiae*, 18.47, in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* (BA 24)… [see n. 73], p. 714-18.

briefly mentioned in his *Confessio brevior*, was further explained in his *Confessio prolixior*. Gottschalk clarified his ideas there and asserted that predestination was not in fact double, but *gemina* or *bipartita*, namely one with two effects because God himself was one but could be called 'good for the benefit of some and just for the punishment of others' (*bonus in beneficio certorum, iustus in supplicio caeterorum*).[92] Gottschalk also explained that he was using here only a figure of speech, referring to predestination as to a tree with two trunks from one root.[93]

This new work of Gottschalk's generated an even stronger and widespread reaction and Hincmar of Rheims immediately set about to prepare a new refutation of double predestination. In that, he was supported again by Hrabanus Maurus, who maintained his position already expressed both at the Council of Mainz, after Gottschalk had presented his *Confessio brevior*, and later, after Hincmar had written his *Ad reclusos et simplices*. Hrabanus continued to offer Scriptural and Patristic quotations in support of divine universal salvific will, but his answer came very late and he seemed not to have essentially too much to add to what he had already asserted.

The Extension of the Controversy

The letters of Prudentius of Troyes, Lupus of Ferrières and Hrabanus Maurus—Hrabanus leaves the debate

Besides appealing to Hrabanus' support, both Hincmar and his suffragan bishop, Pardulus of Laon, considered it necessary to consult the influential theologians of the age on the issue of predestination, which seemed to gain considerably in importance after Gottschalk's *Confessio prolixior* had been written. They especially felt that they had to obtain some support in refuting double predestination once Ratramnus of Corbie had endorsed

[92] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio prolixior* [see n. 85], p. 68 ; cf. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, 12.28, in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin*… [see n. 73], p. 664.

[93] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio prolixior* [see n. 85], p. 67: 'Quod et ipsum genus locutionis usitatissimum est et apud auctores quoque saecularis litteraturae, quod quia rectissimum est ac uearissimum non abs re est si et inde hic ponantur aliqua quae ualeant ad cumulum tuendae sententiae supradictae. Nam et eorum quidam geminam dixit arborem non duas uolens intelligi sed unam et alius qualitatem nominis bipartitam (...)'.

Gottschalk's views. Ratramnus had written Gottschalk a letter[94] in which he had criticised Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices* and had explained that *De induratione cordis pharaonis*, quoted by Hincmar in support of his arguments, was not actually written by Jerome, as Hincmar had stated.[95] Hincmar and Pardulus decided to address letters to other bishops and scholars and to ask for their opinion on the controversy. Pardulus spoke of six such scholars who expressed their ideas, among them being Lupus of Ferrières and Prudentius of Troyes.[96]

But, despite Hincmar's and Pardulus' hopes, when replying,[97] Prudentius did not hide his disagreement with their views. Referring to the doctrine of Augustine, which he deemed to be 'in perfect concordance with the Scriptures',[98] Prudentius supported Gottschalk's view on the predestination of the reprobate, the restricted salvific will of God and the death of Christ only for the elect.[99] However, Prudentius did not teach, as Gottschalk (and Augustine) did, of predestination *ad interitum*, but *ad poenam*, according to human evil deeds.[100]

Prudentius took the scriptural texts referring to the Lord's Supper and Paul's *Epistles* as authorities alongside one of Augustine's interpretations of I Tim II, 4 (*Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri*) in order to prove that God wanted to save some from

[94] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola ad Hincmarum*... [see n. 37], p. 488: 'Ille Corbeyensis monachus in epistula sua vituperavit vos (...) scribendo de vobis ad amicum suum (...)'.

[95] On the Pelagian treatise *De induratione cordis pharaonis*, see n. 68 above.

[96] *Liber de tribus epistolis*, PL 121, cols 985-1068 (1052).

[97] Prudentius of Troyes, *Epistola ad Hincmarum et Pardulum*, PL 115, cols. 971-1010.

[98] *Ibid*., col. 973 : '(...) ut doctrinam beatissimi Patris Augustini, omnium absque ulla dubietate undecunque doctissimi, sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritati in omnibus concordissimam (...)'.

[99] *Ibid*., col. 975: '(...) tres proponit questiones: de praedestinatione reproborum; de Christo pro solis electis mortuo; de Dei voluntate non omnes homines vocandi et salvandi.'

[100] *Ibid*., cols. 976-7: '(...) et praescivit, et praedestinavit, id est preordinavit eius omnipotentia quos per gratiam et sanguinem proprii filii sui, Dei et Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ab eodem perditionis massa misericorditer secretos ad vitam, gloriam regnumque reduceret sempiternum (...) preordinavit non ut peccarent, sed ut propter peccatum poenis perpetuis interirent (...) non ad culpam, sed ad poenam (...)'

each category, generally and not individually.[101] For Prudentius, redemption was granted by the grace of God *non pro omnibus sed pro multis*[102] as the Gospels stated: *Hic est sanguis meus novi testamenti, qui pro multis effunditur in remissionem peccatorum* (Mt. 26, 28; Mc. 14, 24) or *quod pro vobis funditur* (Lc. 22, 20). According to Prudentius, if God had wanted all to be saved, as they were not effectively saved, God's omnipotence would have been denied.[103] Finally, Prudentius referred to the issue of free will and asserted, in pure Augustinian tradition, that salvation was granted by God's grace, human merits being sufficient only for damnation and not for salvation.[104]

Lupus wrote two separate letters: one to Hincmar and another one to Pardulus.[105] He was more moderate but not at all more reassuring for them than Prudentius. The abbot of Ferrières also supported the idea of double predestination, of the elect to salvation through divine grace and of the reprobate to damnation through divine justice, according to the evil deeds forseen by God, and of the justified divine condemnation of humans because of the sin of Adam. Yet, while he accepted the predestination of the elect, he excluded the possibility that the reprobate should be compelled to sin by a divine decision. They were just hardened, namely left in their own *duritia* just like the Pharaoh, who was not compelled to his deeds, but was simply not aided by divine grace. God did not

[101] *Ibid*., cols. 976-7: '(...) sed quoscunque salvat; vel omnes ex omni genere hominum, vel omnes velle fieri salvos (...) si generaliter et non specialiter omnes intelligendi sunt (...)'.

[102] *Ibid*., cols. 976-977.

[103] *Ibid*., col. 977: 'Si aliqua vult, et non facit (...) impotentiae arguitur qui omnipotens praedicatur (...)'.

[104] *Ibid*., col. 1005: 'Liberum enim arbitrium olim ille perpessus, dum suis inconsultius utitur bonis, cadens in praevaricationis profunda demersus, et nihil quemadmodum exinde surgere posset invenit, suaque in aeternum libertate deceptus, huius ruine jacuisset oppressus, nisi eum postea Christi per suam gratiam relevasset adventus.'

[105] Lupus of Ferrières, *Epistula 79 ad Hincmarum*, in *Correspondance*, ed. L Levillain, Paris, Honoré Champion, 1927, p. 36-41. The letter to Pardulus is lost, but it seems to have had the same contents that the one addressed to Hincmar. Both of them were written after January 850 because between July 849 and January 850 Lupus accompanied Charles the Bald on his expedition to Toulouse. In December 849, Lupus was with the king in Bourges, on their way back from the expedition—see F. Lot and L. Halphen, *Le règne de Charles le Chauve*, vol. I, Paris, 1909, p. 207-208.

lead anybody into temptation, but he did not deliver the reprobate (whose sin he had foreknown) out of temptation.[106]

After the two letters, Lupus also wrote a treatise, *Liber de tribus questionibus*, complementary to the letters and responding to Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices*.[107] Being accused by Hincmar and Pardulus of impiety and vanity after that, Lupus wrote yet another letter of justification, this time to Charles the Bald,[108] on the three issues of predestination, free will and the passion of Christ, which he had already discussed with the king in December 849 in Bourges.[109] On predestination, he repeated the answer already forwarded to Hincmar. On free will, he considered that the humans lost it because of the original sin and could regain it only by the aid of grace.[110] Lupus also introduced the idea of the withdrawal of grace[111] (Heb. 10, 13), specifying nevertheless that the reprobate were condemned by their own will; the withdrawal of grace was a consequence of them leaving God, not of God leaving them.[112]

[106] Lupus of Ferrières, *Epistula 79 ad Hincmarum* [see n. 105], p. 38 : 'Hinc est quod qualis Adam a Deo creatus est non nascimur, sed originaliter peccatores, damnatique poena peccati (...) Cum ergo communiter omnes damnati simus cuius nostrum vult indurat, hoc est, in propria duritia derelinquit (...) Sic itaque hos quos indurat praedestinat, non ad supplicium impellendo, sed a peccato quod meretur supplicium non retrahendo: quemadmodum induravit cor Pharaonis (...)'.

[107] Lupus of Ferrières, *Liber de tribus questionibus*, PL 119, cols. 621-648. This treatise will be studied in the next section.

[108] Lupus of Ferrières, *Epistola 78 ad dominum regem*, ed. L Levillain, Paris, Honoré Champion, 1927, p. 22-36.

[109] *Ibid*., p. 22: 'Dudum in urbe Biturigum quaesitis de praedestinatione et libero arbitrio ac redemptione sanguinis Christi quid sentiretur: et ego (...) vestrae maiestati strictius aperui.' Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 109.

[110] *Ibid*., p. 24 : 'Deus ergo fecit excellenter bonam hominis naturam, sed eandem ipse homo vitiavit miserabiliter per spontaneam culpam'; p. 28: 'Non erit igitur in bono liberum illi arbitrium, nisi fuerit divina gratia liberatum.'

[111] Lupus of Ferrières, *Epistula 79 ad Hincmarum* [see n. 105], p. 38: '(...) haec verissima videtur sententia, ut praedestinatio sit in bonis, iuxta intellectum doctissimi Augustini, gratiae praeparatio, praedestinatio autem in malis, secundum nostram capacitatem, gratiae subtractio (...)'.

[112] *Ibid*., p. 40: 'Permissus est ergo iniustus agere quod elegit, ut de malo bene operante Deo claresceret quid esse inter servientem ei et non servientem (...) dum eamdem habentes damnationis causam, in isto aspicerent quod liberatoris gratia evasissent.'

Finally, Lupus asserted that the passion happened *pro universo mundo*; the blood of Christ redeemed all those *qui credere voluerint*—the faithful in general (even the ones who lost grace by sin). In support of his views, Lupus also attached a patristic *Collectaneum* to the letter addressed to the king.[113]

Under these new circumstances, Hincmar asked again Hrabanus Maurus to express his point of view on some of the new writings: his *Ad reclusos et simplices*, the letter of Prudentius, Gottschalk's *Confessio prolixior* and the letter of Ratramnus.[114] All these writings were gathered in a 'dossier', also containing the condemnation of the council of Quierzy I (849), and were sent to Hrabanus in February-March 850. Hrabanus replied to Hincmar's request before the Easter of 850,[115] but his final verdict was to be awaited until the summer. For the moment, he simply referred to seven passages from the Scriptures, which he considered necessary and sufficient for a clear understanding of the issue of predestination.[116] In a new letter,[117] Hrabanus added then another twenty three scriptural passages to the former ones and a few patristic excerpts. He totally approved of Hincmar's ideas in *Ad reclusos et simplices* and only partially of those in the text of Prudentius, his recurrent argument being that he did not even once find the idea of double predestination in the Scriptures.[118]

[113] Lupus of Ferrières, *Collectaneum de tribus questionibus*, PL 119, cols. 647-666—the letter to the king and the *Collectaneum* appear together in the 9th century manuscript *Paris. Nat. lat. 12292*. Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 110, n. 4.

[114] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola 43 ad Hincmarum*... [see n. 37], p. 488: 'Misitis mihi diversa opuscula conscripta, hoc est, imprimis vestrum quod dilectis filiis simplicibus sanctae sedis vestrae confecistis; postea Prudentii Trecassinae civitatis episcopi (...); deinde nugas Gotescalci, quas chartula Ratramni monachi subsecuta est.' Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 108—Cappuyns considers that the 'nugae Gotescalci', mentioned in Hrabanus's *Epistola 43 ad Hincmarum*, in *MGH Epp* V, p. 488 is Gottschalk's *Confessio prolixior*, according to a later citation of it in *Epistola 44 ad Hincmarum*, in *MGH Epp V*, p. 490-499.

[115] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola 43 ad Hincmarum* [see n. 114], pp. 488-90; cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 108.

[116] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola 43 ad Hincmarum* [see n. 114], p. 488.

[117] Hrabanus Maurus, *Epistola 44 ad Hincmarum*, in *MGH Epp V*... [see n. 37], p. 490-499.

[118] *Ibid*., p. 490: '(...) de praedestinatione poenarum predicanda, cum hoc nusquam in sacris scripturis ita positum legerint (...)'.

But in the end, although he acknowledged the agreement between himself and Hincmar, on the one hand, and among Prudentius,[119] Ratramnus and Gottschalk, on the other hand, Hrabanus seemed less and less interested in the debate. As he makes it clear to Hincmar, his point of view had already been expressed in the letters to Noting and Eberhard of Friuli and his bad health and old age prevented him from further developing his arguments.[120] It was then Hincmar who had to continue the debate.

The first treatises on predestination—Lupus of Ferrières and Ratramnus of Corbie—again pastoral discourse, but alongside scholarly one this time

As noted above, in 850, Lupus, abbot of Ferrières, referred in detail to the issues of double predestination, restricted salvific will and redemption through the passion of Christ only for the elect in his treatise *Liber de tribus questionibus*, written, as he declared, out of concern for the peace of the Church, disturbed in Italy and Gaul.[121] Regarding the related issue of free will, he asserted, in the tradition of Augustine, that human free will was corrupted after the Fall and that it could be restored only by divine grace. Lupus considered predestination the effect of gratuitous grace acting for salvation and rejected predestination of the elect to glory *post praevisa merita*.[122] Then, he explained that God

[119] *Ibid*., p. 490. Prudentius is considered on the side of Gottschalk, in his view on predestination: 'Iuxta traditionem Gotescalci, geminam esse praedestinationem, scilicet quod sicut electos praesciendo et praedestinando Deus ad vitam, ita reprobos praesciendo et praedestinando ducat at poenas.'

[120] *Ibid*., p. 490: 'Singillatim autem cunctis propositionibus eius per singula loca respondere (...) non me permittit infirmitas corporis, nec aegritudo senectutis. Quae autem de praescientia et praedestinatione Dei in sacris libris didici et sententias quas probatas a canonicis scriptoribus in divinis Testamentis inveni, prout memoriae tunc occurebant, in opusculis meis tunc inserui quae ad Notingum episcopum et Eberhardum comitem praeterito tempore contra Gotescalci errorem confeci.' Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 108.

[121] Cf. Lupus of Ferrières, *Liber de tribus epistolis*... [see n. 96], col. 623: '(...) comperissem primum in Italia, deinde in Gallia, si non concuti fidem, turbari certe quorumdam intentionem, quod de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione bonorum et malorum ac de sanguinis Domini taxatione vulgo quaedam inaudita iactarentur (...)'.

[122] *Ibid*., PL 119, col. 637: 'Caeterum ubicunque de electione, vel praescientia, sive praedestinatione Apostoli loquuntur, quicunque Deum propterea

was not the agent as regards the evil wills of the reprobate or the punishments they could trigger, but only the censor and the judge.[123] The reprobate were not predestined to sin, even if God had foreseen the evil in them. According to Lupus, there could be prescience without predestination, but there could not be predestination without prescience and there was no necessity imposed on the reprobate. Predestination was only for good and it was the preparation of grace, as Augustine had stated, in order that God may save the ones who were effectively saved.[124]

However, Lupus seemed to suddenly remember at some point that he was an official of the Church, that he had to encourage his parishioners not to despair, but to trust God's mercy. At that point, he seemed to forget the abstract theological debate and started preaching repentance. He insisted that nobody could know whether he was one of the elect or one of the reprobate. The ones who committed such irreparable sins that they could consider themselves damned had to remember that it was never too late to repent. For that, they had the example of the thief on the cross, saved by Christ at the last moment before his death.[125]

The problems regarding predestination inherited from Augustine seem thus to persist in Lupus' own work. One could even wonder what Lupus meant here by 'reprobate', whether the word had

elegisse praescisse aut praedestinasse quoslibet asserunt quod praescierit eos devotos sibi futuros et in eadem devotione mansuros (...) ne evacuetur divinae gratiae donum (...)'.

[123] *Ibid.*, PL 119, col. 638: 'Deum itaque, qui adjuvat ut bona sit voluntas (...) Auctor itaque sicut non est malae voluntatis impiorum, ita nec aliorum quorumlibet peccatorum quae ex ea procedunt. Verum qui non est auctor ullius omnino reatus, est profecto censor et iudex.'

[124] *Ibid.*, PL 119, cols. 638-639: 'Praescientia futurorum, nobis dumtaxat, nam Deo simul praesto sunt omnia, praenotionem insinuat. Praedestinationem autem in bono positam dicimus ostendere in sanctis litteris gratiae praeparationem; gratiam vero ipsam exprimere donationem. Praescit Deus quaecunque aut facturus est aut permissurus, utraque nulla necessitate, alterum communione iniustitiae nulla (...) Proinde praedestinatio nunquam est sine praescientia. Nihil enim quod nesciat se facturum Deus praedestinat. Praescientia vero est et plerumque sine praedestinatione (...)'.

[125] *Ibid.*, PL 119, col. 641: '(...) quod hi, quanquam maxima crimina virtutum copia propulsaverint atque oppresserint (...) saltem illum latronem aspiciat, qui supplicium crucis haud dubie sceleratis actibus meruit, et per solam fidem, quae subito confessionem peperit atque spem, in media morte vitam invenit.'

for him a weaker meaning, namely that of any possible sinner, or a stronger one, namely that of a reprobate. In my opinion, this is an example of two types of discourse — of the 'scholar' and of the 'prelate' — which are equally represented here within the same work, differently from Hincmar, in his *Ad reclusos et simplices*, where the pastoral discourse of the 'prelate' was predominant.

In the following pages, one will notice that this kind of double discourse will appear in Hincmar as well and also in other Church officials involved in the 9th-century debate on predestination. They may have gradually become aware that, on the one hand, the ideals of the *renovatio* required free will and action, whether of the individual or of the community and that, on the other hand, the Augustinian stand (especially the views in the later works of Augustine) undercut this very idea of free will and action. In a period when they were witnessing the gradual disintegration of the political structures within the framework of which the Carolingian cultural *renovatio* had developed,[126] the Carolingian prelates may have found themselves caught between two equally important and opposed requirements: that of conformity to the doctrine of Augustine and that of various pastoral discourses and social concerns.

This situation may have actually generated the two types of discourse mentioned above: one oriented towards God's goodness, omnipotence and immutability and the other oriented towards the necessity of accounting for the evil in society and in people's everyday lives in the light of a higher good, known only by the creator and not by the limited creature. This may have been, in fact, the situation also in Hrabanus' works, when he asserted that God's judgements were impenetrable. At the same time it could have been the compromise solution for an unsoluble problem, as it may be observed in the case of Lupus of Ferrières.

This double discourse does not appear in the works of yet another participant in the debate, Ratramnus of Corbie. But Ratramnus, just like Gottschalk, was not an official of the Church, but simply a scholar. Well known in his time for his erudition, he first compiled, at the request of Charles the Bald, a scriptural and pa-

[126] Cf. Marta Cristiani, *La notion de loi dans le 'De praedestinatione' de Jean Scot*, in *Studi Medievali*, 17 (1976), p. 81-114 (81). Here Cristiani refers particularly to the period 845-870, which contains the period in which the debate on predestination developed.

tristic dossier on predestination in which he assembled authorities and quotations for the readers who had no access to a copy of one work or another. It was the time when patristic texts only started accumulating in the monastery libraries throughout the Carolingian Empire and just then it was slowly becoming possible for scholars to engage in a theological controversy on a regional scale.[127]

As David Ganz pointed out, Ratramnus annotations on manuscripts of Augustine's *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, available in the rich Corbie library, in mid-9th century, compared to the excerpts from Augustine, quoted in Ratramnus' own works, prove not only the special interest Ratramnus had for the issue of predestination but also

[127] For instance, on Florus' access to (and acquaintance with) manuscripts of Augustine's works such as *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, *De natura et gratia* and *De civitate Dei*, proved by his annotations on the manuscripts available in Lyons, see Célestin Charlier, *Les manuscrits personnels de Florus de Lyons*, in *Mélanges E. Podechard*, Lyon, Facultés Catholiques, 1945, p. 71-84. Cf. E.A. Lowe, *Codices lugdunenses antiquissimi. Le scriptorium de Lyon, la plus ancienne école calligraphique de France*, Lyon, Bibliothéque de la ville de Lyon, 1924. See also Klaus Zechiel-Eckes, *Florus von Lyon als Kirchenpolitiker und Publizist: Studien zur Persönlichkeit eines karolingischen 'Intellektuellen' am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung mit Amalarius (835-838) und des Prädestinationsstreits (851-855)*. Ostfildern, Thorbecke, 1999. Valuable information on the spread of the manuscripts can also be found in the books of David Ganz on the monastery of Corbie: David Ganz, *Corbie in the Carolingian Renaissance*, Sigmaringen, Thorbecke, 1990; David Ganz, *The Merovingian Library of Corbie*. Oxford, BAR, 1981 and in F.M. Carey, *The Scriptorium of Reims during the archbishopric of Hincmar (845-882)*, in *Classical and Medieval Studies in Honour of E.K.Rand*, ed. L.W. Johnes, New York, 1938, p. 41-60. Worth considering is also the article by Michael M. Gorman, *Harvard's Oldest Latin Manuscript*, in Michael M. Gorman, *The Manuscript Traditions of the Works of St. Augustine*. Florence, Sismel, 2001, p. 301-314. In this article, Gorman suggests that Gottschalk of Orbais may have used a manuscript from Trier, MS Typ 495, containing Augustine's *Enchiridion*, his commentaries on Romans and Galatians, Jerome's commentaries on Galatians and Ephesians, a *Life of Jerome* and a Pseudo-Gregory treatise. See also Michael Gorman, *The Manuscript Traditions of St. Augustine's Major Works*, in Michael M. Gorman, *The Manuscript Traditions…* [see *supra*], p. 315-412 and Gert Partoens, *La collection de Sermons augustiniennes 'De verbis Apostoli': Introduction et liste des manuscrits les plus anciens*, in *Revue Bénédictine*, 111 (2001), p. 317-352 (321-324 and 338-339), on Florus of Lyons' *Expositio epistolarum beati Pauli* and his *florilegium*.

the fact that he had these manuscripts at hand and that he could read them and make comments on them.[128]

What is also interesting to note here is the fact that most of the works on predestination reached the participants *via* Charles the Bald. He was a learned king and different scholars acknowledged that by sending and dedicating treatises to him. Sometimes it was him who commissioned the treatises to be written, as in the case of Ratramnus' 'dossier' and of other works, to be further discussed.

As for the issue of double predestination, Ratramnus, who was already on the side of Gottschalk, pleaded in favour of the latter's views in his 'dossier', but was prudent enough to ask the king not to communicate his ideas to anybody before the king himself approved of them and corrected them together with the author.[129] This may have been more than just a preventative measure taken against Hincmar, at a moment when the debate had not yet entered its more 'public' phase. The king seems to have respected Ratramnus' wish until 855, when he remitted the work to Hincmar, who refuted it in his second treatise on predestination. Unfortunately, this treatise was lost and only its preface was preserved by Flodoard in his *Historia Rhemensis Ecclesiae*.[130]

Ratramnus of Corbie was then invited by Charles the Bald to express his own opinion on predestination and the other related issues in the same year 850, in which Lupus wrote his own treatise. While quoting abundantly from Augustine, Fulgentius or Isidore, Ratramnus thus wrote his treatise *De praedestinatione libri duo*,[131]

[128] Ganz, *Corbie*... [see n. 127]. For instance, Ganz shows that Augustine's *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, *De civitate Dei* and *Ennarationes in Psalmos* were amongst the works to be found at Corbie by c. 700 —cf. Ganz, *Corbie*... [see n. 127], p. 126-28. Moreover, Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, *Enchiridion*, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *Contra Iulianum* and *Retractationes* were copied at Corbie during the 9th century —cf. Ganz, *Corbie*... [see n. 127], p. 144-147.

[129] Ratramnus of Corbie, *De Praedestinatione libri duo ad regem Carolum*, PL 121, cols.13-80 (14, 42, 80).

[130] Flodoard, *Historia Rhemensis Ecclesiae*, in *MGH SS* XIII [see n. 52], p. 502: 'Item collegit atque composuit volumen ingens plures continens libros de praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio contra quosdam reprehensores suos atque Ratramnum monachum Corbeiensem, ad eumdem Karolum regem; qui talem praefert epistolam (...)'.

[131] Ratramnus of Corbie, *De Praedestinatione*... [see n. 129], cols. 14-80.

out of which one book was dedicated to the *divina dispositio* and the second to predestination.

Some of Ratramnus' main tenets resembled Lupus': faith, be it inchoate or perfect, was a gift of God, not a human merit (*fides igitur et inchoata et perfecta donum Dei est*)[132] and free will was lost after the Fall and restored only by the grace of God (*'Denique homini per Dei gratiam liberum restauratur arbitrium, quod primus homo perdiderat*).[133] Just like Gottschalk, Ratramnus also emphasised the immutable nature of God: since God was immutable, his disposition was also immutable regarding both the elect and the reprobate;[134] the sins of men were foreknown and also predestined, due to this simple, unitary, immutable nature of God, whose judgement was also immutable.[135] Thus, predestination of the reprobate to eternal death was a just divine act since God had foreseen their sins and nothing could be changed about that.[136]

[132] *Ibid*., col. 38.

[133] *Ibid*., col. 63.

[134] *Ibid*., col. 15: 'Et sicut nihil novi est apud illum, ita in aeterna dispositione consistunt immobiliter fixa qualiter creaturarum ordo per successiones temporum agatur: in qua sempiternitatis dispositione et electorum finem et reproborum cognovit, et de singulis quid agendum sit sempiterno consilio immutabiliter determinatum est. Haec autem sempiterni consilii dispositio praedestinatio est operum Dei, qua praedestinatione et electos disponit ad regnum, et reprobos ad poenas.'

[135] *Ibid*., col. 76: 'Simplex etenim natura divinitatis, sicut nihil recipit mutabile, sic nihil compositum. Unde in Deo scientia et dispositio non variantur, ut alio tempore Deus sciat, et alio disponat; sed simul scit, simul etiam disponit, quanquam nonnulla sciat, quae non disponat, sicut sunt peccata: neque enim ad dispositionem illius pertinent, quae ipse non facit, quamvis qui peccant, divinae potestatis iudicium non evadant, et unde pravitatis suae nequitiam exercent, inde occulto Dei iudicio deserviant. Itaque non est in Deo scientia sine dispositione, nec dispositio sine scientia. Alioquin si scientia inest ei sine dispositione, ut alio tempore sciat et alio disponat, iam non erit simplicis naturae Deus, iam non erit incommutabilis.'

[136] *Ibid*., col. 55: 'Non ideo tamen compelluntur ad poenam quia non ex eo quod praedestinati sunt iudicantur, sed ex eo quod peccatores praesciti sunt, ad poenas praedestinati cognoscuntur: sicut enim nemo potest imputare Deo quod peccat, ita quoque quod pro peccatis puniendus sit. Peccat enim propria voluntate delinquens, puniendus autem est iusto iudicio iudicantis: et sicut peccati causa non ex Dei praescientia descendit, quia nullus idcirco peccat quia Deus eum peccaturum praescierit, sed idcirco quia magis propriae concupiscentiae obedit quam praecepto prohibentis Dei a peccato.'

John Scot Eriugena and His Critics

Eriugena's De divina praedestinatione liber—*employing logic and analysing language in order to demonstrate divine unity and refute double predestination*

Faced with these treatises on predestination, Hincmar discussed the opinions of Prudentius, Ratramnus and Lupus with Charles the Bald. This time, the king commissioned John Scot Eriugena, the court scholar, to write a treatise against Gottschalk and the idea of double predestination. This debate on predestination actually occasioned the first reference to Eriugena as a teacher of liberal arts at the king's palace school. The reference appears in a letter on predestination written by Pardulus and addressed to the Church of Lyons.[137]

Eriugena's treatise, *De divina praedestinatione liber* (851),[138] comprising of a preface, nineteen chapters and an epilogue, was written with the same aim as the letters written by Hincmar and Pardulus: to prove that God was not responsible for evil, that he was a just judge and that human beings possessed free will, although they also needed the aid of divine grace to attain salvation. However, Eriugena's method for accomplishing his task was very different from the others': he used the logical *quadrivium* of division, definition, demonstration and analysis and also referred to the device of *a contrario*[139], as a mode in which words signify.

[137] Pardulus, *Epistola ad Ecclesiam Lugdunensem*, lost, but cited in *Liber de tribus epistolis*, PL 121, col 1052: 'Sed quia haec inter se valde dissentiebant, Scotum illum qui est in palatio regis, Ioannem nomine, scribere coegimus (...)' Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 59.

[138] Cf. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 111—The only manuscript available is a 9th-century one from Corbie. It is included in the Paris Nat. lat 13386, f^os^ 103^r^-158^v^ and constitutes the basis for the editions of Mauguin, in *Veterum auctorum* and Floss, in PL 122, cols. 355-440. A more recent and better edition was provided by Goulven Madec in CCCM 50. More details on the nineteen chapters and the epilogue in O'Meara, *Eriugena* [see n. 1], p. 38-40.

[139] John Scot Eriugena, *De divina praedestinatione liber*, CCCM 50, ed Goulven Madec, Turnhout, Brepols, 1978, cap. 9, p. 58: ex. Sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud Deum (I Cor. 3, 19); p. 61: 'Conficitur ergo, praescientiam et praedestinationem similitudine rerum temporalium ad Deum transferri. Qui locus a contrario uideretur, si temporalia aeternitati contradictoriae opponerentur.' On the *a contrario* argument, cf. also O'Meara, *Eriugena* [see n. 1], p. 42-45.

Eriugena considered human language itself as a source of dilemmas when discussing predestination. He explained that words could signify either by similitude or by contrariety[140] and that the concepts of the human mind without a sensible correspondent were more difficult to express in words; in this latter case, contrariety could be more suggestive.[141]

However, Eriugena continued to explain that, when referring to God's essence, it was impossible to use the *a contrario* since there was nothing contrary to him, namely to being, but the non-being, which could not be predicated about God.[142] Eriugena's tenet was that all that existed, except God, pertained to both being and non-being and could be referred to by using contrariety. God, on the other hand, could be approximated by human language only by analogy with what was higher and most abstract in the human world.[143]

Against the Augustinian idea that God predestined the elect from eternity,[144] Eriugena considered that predestination should

[140] *Ibid*., cap. 9, p. 59: '(...) quod duobus locis conveniant, similitudini uidelicet atque contrarietati.'

[141] *Ibid*., cap. 9, pp. 57-8: 'Restat ea quae contrarietatis loco sumuntur. Quibus tanta uis inest significandi, ut quodam priuilegio ecellentiae suae merito a graecis entimemata dicantur, hoc est conceptiones mentis. Quamuis enim omne, quod uoce profertur prius mente concipiatur, non tamen omne, quod mente concipitur, eandem uim significationis, dum sensibus feruore infunditur, habere uidetur. Sicut ergo argumentorum omnium fortissimum est illud quod sumitur a contrario, ita omnium signorum uocalium aptissimum est quod ducitur ab eodem contrarietatis loco.'

[142] *Ibid*., cap. 9, p. 58: 'Nec mirum cum nihil Deo contrarium sit, nissi non esse, quoniam ipse solus est, qui dixit: Ego sum qui sum, cetera uero quae dicuntur esse nec omnino sunt, quia non sunt quod ipse est, nec omnino non sunt, quia ab ipso sunt qui solus est esse.'

[143] *Ibid*., cap. 9, p. 56-7: 'Proinde signorum uerbalium, quibus humanae locutionis consuetudine ad significandum ipsum Deum aut eis administrationem in uniuersa creatura utitur diuina humanaque industria, quaedam sunt quasi propria, quorum exempla sunt in uerbis quidem: sum, est, erat, esse, in nominibus uero: essentia, ueritas, uirtus, sapientia, scientia, destinatio, ceteraque huiusmodi quae, quoniam in natura nostra quicquid primum optimumque sit significant, id est ipsam substantiam et eius optima, sine quibus immortalis esse non potest, accidentia, non absurde referuntur ad unum optimumque principium omnium bonorum quod est Deus, quaedam uero aliena, hoc est translata, quae tribus sedibus venire solent, a similitudine uidelicet, a contrario, a differentia.'

[144] A u g u s t i n e, *De dono perseverantiae*, 18.47, in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* (BA 24)... [see n. 73], p. 716: 'Haec est illa electio, qua eos quos voluit,

not be seen as direct intervention since it could not be separated from the moment of action and from God himself.[145] According to Eriugena, Augustine had referred to God's foresight regarding future events by using an analogy with human action. When talking about predestination to death, Augustine used—in Eriugena's view—'strikingly inadequate concepts' as figurative expressions intended to underline the difference between God and evil. Moreover, Eriugena insists that, generally, the Fathers called the sinners 'predestined' by using the *antiphrasis* (e.g. when Jesus called Judas 'friend').[146]

Then, while Lupus and, before him, Gottschalk himself or Hrabanus Maurus and Hincmar founded their arguments on the idea of divine omnipotence, Eriugena logically deduced his own from the unity of the divine substance.[147] Thus, Eriugena explained that God's essence was unique since nothing was double in God and that divine predestination pertained to divine essence (predestination was equivalent with prescience and with God's wisdom and, thus, with God himself—*praevideo* = *praedefinio* = *praedestino*). It was, then, totally inappropriate to talk of divine predestination as if God were in time and not in eternity.[148] Predestination, as well as prescience, presupposed an interval of time between vision and event while in God there was no such difference.[149]

elegit in Christo ante constitutionem mundi, ut essent sancti et immaculati in conspectu eius in charitate, praedestinans eos in adoptionem filiorum (Ephes. 1, 4-5).' On the use of Augustine in Eriugena's *De praedestinatione*, see details in Gérard Mathon, *L'utilisation des textes de saint Augustin par Jean Scot Érigène dans son 'De Praedestinatione'*, in *Augustinus Magister*. Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1954, vol. III, p. 419-428.

[145] Eriugena, *De praedestinatione*... [see n. 139], cap. 2, p. 11: 'Si ergo ante secula nihil creditur et intelligitur praeter solum Deum fuisse, praedestinationem autem Dei ante omnem creaturam esse nullus sanus ambigit, colligitur praedestinationem Dei ipsum Deum esse atque ad naturam eius pertinere.'

[146] *Amice ad quid*? (Mt. 26, 50).

[147] An explanation of Eriugena's argument that is similar to the one that follows can be found also in O'Meara, *Eriugena* [see n. 1], p. 40-41 and in Cristiani, *La notion de loi* [see n. 126], p. 84-85, 105-107.

[148] Eriugena, *De praedestinatione*... [see n. 139], cap. 9, p. 61: 'Ac per hoc sicut abusiue de Deo dicitur fecisse uel facturum esse, ita de eo dicitur abusiue praesciisse, praescire, praesciturum esse, simili modo praedestinasse, praedestinare, praedestinaturum esse.'

[149] *Ibid*., cap. 9, pp. 59-60: 'In eo enim, sicut nulla locorum spatia sunt, ita nulla temporum interualla. Ac per hoc nulla recta ratio permittit talia

Likewise, for Eriugena, divine predestination was not different from divine will[150] since it was not an accident but pertained to the divine substance.[151] Eriugena also discussed the classical passage from Isidore of Seville's *Sententiae* II, 6,[152] used by Gottschalk in his *Confessio prolixior*,[153] where God's predestination was defined as *gemina* (and distinguished from *duplex*).[154] Just like Ratramnus before him, Eriugena referred to the simple, unitary nature of God. But, while Ratramnus did not conclude from this that predestination, as pertaining to God's unitary nature, had to be unitary too (Ratramnus chose to emphasise rather the immutability of God than his unity), Eriugena did so and concluded that predestination was certainly unitary and not double.

de deo iure proprietatis intelligi. Quomodo quipe praescientia eius dicitur, cui nulla futura sunt? Sicut enim nulla eius memoria proprie dicitur, cui nihil est praeteritum, ita nulla praescientia, quia nullum futurum. Eodem nanque modo Deus uidit, praeuidit, sciuit, praesciuit omnia facienda, priusquam fierent, quo uidet et scit eadem, postquam facta sunt, quoniam, sicut ipse semper aeternus est, ita uniuersitas, quam fecit semper in ipso aeterna est.'

[150] *Ibid*., cap. 3, p. 18: 'Non enim deo aliud est uelle, aliud praedestinare, quoniam omne quod fecit praedestinando uoluit et uolendo praedestinauit.'

[151] *Ibid*., cap. 2, p. 11: '(...) colligitur praedestinationem Dei ipsum Deum esse atque ad naturam eius pertinere' and cap. 2, p. 16-17: 'Quapropter, si unam incommutabilem Dei essentiam, indiuisibilemque eius simplicitatem nomine sapientiae, nomine scientiae, ceterisque nominibus, sicuti uirtutis, potestatis, iustitiae, ueritatis, aeternitatis, operationis, similibusque non incongrue significamus, necessario sequitur praedestinationis quoque uocabulo eiusdem inseparabilis essentiae naturam conuenientissime insinuari. Deinde si impium est duas essentias in Deo doceri uel duas sapientias, scientias, uirtutes, ceteraque omnia quae de Deo dicuntur, geminari uel triplicari uel quacunquae multiplici specie cumulari, quicunque duas in Deo praedestinationes asserere conuincitur, reatu impietatis ligatur. Vna est enim diuina praedestinatio, sicut una est diuina operatio, diuina sapientia, diuina substantia, diuina uoluntas.'

[152] Isidore of Seville, *Sententiae* 2.6.1, PL 83, col. 606: 'Gemina est praedestinatio sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem.'

[153] Gottschalk of Orbais, *Confessio prolixior* [see n. 85], p. 67: 'Non enim, ait: due sunt quia non sunt, sed gemina, id est bipartita (...)'.

[154] Eriugena, *De praedestinatione...* [see n. 139], cap. 3, p. 22-23: 'Praedestinatio essentialiter de Deo praedicari non est dubium; essentia autem unitas; praedestinatio igitur unitas. Vnitas dupla non est; praedestinatio itaque dupla non est; ac per hoc nec gemina. Quomodo enim sit geminatio, ubi non sit numerus et pluralitas? Diuina unitas numerosa caret pluralitate; caret igitur duplicitate.'

Moreover, Eriugena defined God as *summa essentia*, *summum bonum* and *summa vita* and explained that, as *summa vita*, God could not predetermine death[155] and, as *summum bonum*, he could neither create evil nor predetermine punishment. And here one can detect a clear influence of Augustine in Eriugena. Just as Augustine, Eriugena considered evil only a negation, a privation of good.[156] To perform evil deeds meant to move away from the source of goodness, which was also the source of being. Evil was thus an absence of being, a defect, an accident,[157] which could not come from God, the *summa essentia*.[158] Thus, Eriugena insisted, while following Augustine, the evil-doers simply ceased to be, they became nothing. The evil actions and their consequences fell under the same logical category; they existed in humans as corruptions of good. Sin was the deficiency of justice and punishment the negation of beatitude. Consequently, it was not possible to predestine sin or punishment since they did not exist and could not even be known.[159]

[155] *Ibid*., Epilogue, p. 121: 'Nulli nanque catholico licet credere summam bonitatem ex qua est omne bonum praedestinasse alicui aliquam malitiam, et summam uitam ex qua et in qua et per quam omnia uiuunt alicui praedestinasse interitum uel poenam, quando ne id quidem quod se inuicem perdit perire permittit.'

[156] A u g u s t i n e, *De civitate dei*, 12.7 [see n. 28], vol. I, p. 577: 'Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae uoluntatis; non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio sed defectio.'

[157] E r i u g e n a, *De praedestinatione…* [see n. 139], cap. 8, p. 49: 'Nec nos moueat si dicantur accidentia quaedam quae ex natura non sunt : non enim sunt uere accidentia sed naturalium accidentium aut absentiae aut defectus, id est corruptiones.'

[158] *Ibid*., cap. 3, p. 21: 'Est autem Deus summa essentia. Est igitur eorum tantum, quae ab eo sunt causa. Peccatum, mors, miseria a Deo non sunt. Eorum igitur causa Deus non est. Idem quoque syllogismus hoc modo conectitur: non et Deus eorum quae sunt causa sit et eorum quae nihil sunt causa sit. Est autem Deus eorum causa quae sunt. Igitur non est causa eorum quae non sunt. Peccatus eiusque effectus, mors profecto qui adhaeret miseria, non sunt. Eorum igitur nec Deus nec eius praedestinatio quae est quod ipse est causa esse potest.'

[159] *Ibid*., cap. 14, p. 86-7: 'Quomodo enim uel praesciuntur uel praedestinantur quae non sunt?' and cap. 15, p. 92: '(...) quae omnia, ut ait Augustinus, nesciendo sciuntur, quorum inscitia eorum est scientia, sic nimirum sancta auctoritas Deum asserit uel praesciisse uel praedestinasse peccata uel poenas, quae nec praesciri, nec praedestinari possunt. Non enim in deffinitionibus formarum sciri, sed in defectibus earum nesciri noscuntur. Quid

The critics of John Scot Eriugena—Carolingian scholars' attention switches from Gottschalk to Eriugena

The treatise of John Scot Eriugena was received with even more consternation than the writings of Gottschalk and it was followed by refutations written by Prudentius of Troyes and Florus of Lyons, which emphasised Eriugena's tendency to misuse the authority of the Patristic tradition (or not to use it at all) and to found his argument on his own suppositions.[160] As John Marenbon pointed out, Prudentius complained about Eriugena's 'sophistry' and about his knowledge of liberal arts (especially logic) but, 'both Prudentius and Florus were also able to use the logical terminology of substance and accident' and Prudentius even 'took the trouble to show his knowledge of the Aristotelian categories and of the syllogistic technique'.[161] While employing such knowledge in analysing the concepts and the arguments of Eriugena's treatise, Prudentius and Florus wanted to demonstrate that it was, in fact, full of contradictions and inadequately argumented because the author had allegedly relied upon his own reason (which offered him only a limited understanding) instead of appealing to the authority of the Patristic tradition. Detailed presentations of their refutations are given in what follows.

Prudentius' De praedestinatione contra Johannem Scotum

Prudentius received some extracts from the nineteen chapters of Eriugena's treatise from Wenilo, Archbishop of Sens (837/8-865), a friend of Lupus of Ferrières. In response, he wrote a long treatise, *De praedestinatione contra Johannem Scotum* (852),[162] with

enim? Nunquid aliud significat nihil nisi notionem cogitantis defectum essentiae. Quid significant tenebrae uel silentium nisi notionem cogitantis uel lucem uel uocem deesse?' (cf. A u g u s t i n e, *De civitate Dei* 12.7 [see n. 28], vol. I, p. 577).

[160] F l o r u s, *Sub nomine Ecclesiae Lugdunensis adversus Ioannis Scoti Erigenae erroneas definitiones liber*, PL 119, cols. 101-250 (101-102): 'Venerunt ad nos (id est, ad Ecclesiam Lugdunensem) cuiusdam vaniloqui et garruli hominis scripta, qui velut de praescientia et praedestinatione divina, humanis et, ut ipse gloriatur, philosophicis argumentationibus disputans, nulla ratione reddita, nulla Scripturarum sive sanctorum Patrum auctoritate praelata, velut tenenda et sequenda sola sua praesumptione definire ausus est.'

[161] Marenbon, *John Scot...* [see n. 12], p. 312.

[162] P r u d e n t i u s, *De praedestinatione contra Ioannem Scotum*, PL 115, cols. 1009-1366 (1010-1011): 'Misisti mihi quandam schedulam decem et

a preface by Wenilo attached to it. Prudentius did not discuss only the extracts sent by Wenilo, but all the work of Eriugena, which he seems to have read in totality at some point. Passages from this work, quoted and preceded by a condemnatory *theta*,[163] are followed in Prudentius' treatise by corrections containing extensive patristic excerpts.

Prudentius' criticism was harsh: he accused Eriugena of sophistry, blasphemy and vanity. For him, Eriugena was the new Julian of Æclanum,[164] the one spreading unorthodox views, not Gottschalk. At some point, nevertheless, Prudentius accused Gottschalk himself of allegedly initiating a new heresy opposed to Pelagianism.[165] Prudentius reacted especially against what he called the *quadrivium vanitatis*, the four divisions of philosophy employed by Eriugena, and advised the latter to find his way to the truth on the basis of the *quadriga* of the four Gospels, the four virtues and the four meanings of the Scriptures.[166]

novem capitula continentem, ex libro cuiusdam Scoti selecta, a nostro ut ais se quodammodo intellectu divertentia, rogans et monens ut quaecumque in eis a vero exorbitantia comperissem, unicuique (...) devianti capitulo congruo depromerem abunde responsa.'

[163] *Ibid.*, col. 1012: 'Verba quoque eiusdem Ioannis ut ab eo digesta sunt pluribus locis inservi, praeposito etiam nomine ipsius cum praecedente illud nota quae graece dicitur theta, quam sententiis capitalibus damnandorum aliqui praescribere solebant.'

[164] *Ibid.*, col. 1011: '(...) Pelagii, Coelestii, eorumque sequacis ac defensoris acerrimi Iuliani, per omnia sectatorem Ioannem videlicet Scotum tanta impudentia orthodoxae fidei Patribusquae catholicis oblatrantem, ac si unus spiritus Iulianum Ioannemque docuerint.' See also cols. 1013, 1015, 1016, 1036. Cf. also Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 115 and Lavaud, *La controverse…* [see n. 16], col. 2912.

[165] Eriugena, *De praedestinatione…* [see n. 139], cap. 4, p. 26-27: 'Haec igitur haeresis gotescalcana, si tali nomine potest uocari, inter duas alias haereses sibi inuicem adversantes, medietatis loco constituta est; inter illam plane quae dicitur pelagiana et illam quae ei repugnat; quarum una dono diuine gratiae derogat, altera libertatem arbitrii rationalis naturae in tantum commendat ut sine dono gratiae ad perficiendam hominis iustitiam sufficiat. Eius uero secta contraria gratuitae gratiae donum confirmat ut eo solo in homine operante, omni conatu liberi arbitrii contempto, omnis fidelis fastigium iustitiae contingat. Vna igitur, ut dictum est, donum gratiae contemnit, altera donum libertatis arbitrii, ambae impietate pares, secta uero dispares.'

[166] Prudentius, *De praedestinatione…* [see n. 162], col. 1352: 'Relinque quadrivium vanitatis, quod sequens extorris viae factus es veritatis. Quanto melius, quantoque salubrius ageres, si uni verae sempiternaeque

Quoting the same Patristic authorities as Gottschalk and, among them, obviously Augustine, he supported again Gottschalk's idea of double predestination of the elect to beatitude and eternal life and of the reprobate to punishment and eternal death.[167] He pointed out that prescience and predestination were relative attributes of God, while wisdom, truth and will were essential attributes. Differently from Eriugena, Prudentius maintained that prescience was separated from predestination—that many things were foreseen by God and yet not predestined.

But Prudentius' main objections against Eriugena's treatise referred to the punishment of the evil will alone and not of the entire human nature. In Prudentius' view, to consider that only the corruption of the will accounted for the sins of humans meant to separate the will from the person who willed. On the contrary, he maintained, the will did not exist in itself, separately from the being who possessed it. The will was a spontaneous movement of the soul;[168] the soul employed its will towards good or evil and bore the responsibility for that.[169]

Finally, Prudentius insisted that the knowledge which enabled human beings to will the good came as a gift from God. Divine grace determined the human good will and the impulse to conver-

viae innitens (...) Quadriga huius viae sunt quator Evangelia (...) quator sunt virtutes, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia (...) quator divinorum eloquiorum species historica, ethica, allegorica, anagogica (...)' Cf. also O'Meara, *Eriugena* [see n. 1], p. 48 and Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène* [see n. 8], p. 115.

[167] P r u d e n t i u s, *De praedestinatione*... [see n. 162], col. 1029: 'Quod enim beatus Gregorius praedestinationes pluraliter, hoc sanctus Isidorus geminam praedestinationem vocavit (...) intellexerat eum cum caeteris catholicis tractatoribus sensisse praedestinatos quosdam ad gloriam, quosdam ad ignominiam, illos ad regnum, istos ad tormentum; illos ad beatitudinem supernorum, istos ad supplicium inferorum.'

[168] *Ibid*., col. 1252: 'Quapropter quidquid de voluntate (quam constat per se non esse naturam sed naturae, id est animae motum spontaneum) (...) quipe cum voluntas sicut per se non esse, ita per se velle, id est moveri non possit, et quidquid voluntate agitur, volenti procul dubio imputetur.'

[169] *Ibid*., col. 1052: 'Nulla creatura dei non est bona—I Tim. IV, 4—'non est igitur voluntas hominis atque scientia non sunt eius substantia, sed dona Dei indita humanae substantiae, id est animae rationali: quibus si bene usa fuerit, servat atque exornat in se imaginem et similitudinem Dei: si autem eis voluptuose abusa fuerit (...) deformat eam nequiter ac deturpat (...)'.

sion came only from God.[170] Nothing could be done without the aid of God as the example of Peter, assisted by Christ at the moment of his denial, could prove.[171]

Florus' Sub nomine Ecclesiae Lugdunensis adversus Joannis Scoti Erigenae erroneas definitiones liber

Florus of Lyons (who seems to have read only fragments from Eriugena's treatise and also the refutation of Prudentius) also wrote a treatise, *Sub nomine Ecclesiae Lugdunensis adversus Joannis Scoti Erigenae erroneas definitiones liber*. According to David Ganz, Florus, the secretary of Archbishop Agobard, was 'the most widely read of the Carolingian theologians (...) an expert in law and liturgy', who prepared a patristic commentary on the Pauline *Epistles* and assembled the collection of Augustinian extracts which later accompanied Amolo's letter to Gottschalk.[172]

In his treatise against Eriugena, Florus was very keen to explain the difference between prescience and predestination.[173] He also pointed out that, from the fact that predestination was a *singularis tantum*, it did not necessarily follow that it could be substantially predicated about God. And, thus, the impossibility (suggested by Eriugena) of conceiving the existence of God

[170] *Ibid*., col. 1081: 'Quomodo enim convertit nos, nisi, praeveniente gratia, voluntatem convertendi misericorditer infundendo?'

[171] *Ibid*., col. 1063: '(...) non potuisse recordari Petrum, nisi prius Dominus respexisset, id est voluntatem recordandi ac flendi misericorditer infudisset.'

[172] Ganz, *The Debate on Predestination* [see n. 11], p. 294. See more details on these in Charlier, *Les manuscrits personnels...* [see n. 127], p. 72. Also for arguments in favour of Florus' paternity of this treatise, see also Charlier, *Les manuscrits personnels...* [see n. 127], p. 79. More on Florus' scholarship and erudition in *Histoire de l'Église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 6: *L'époque carolingienne*, eds. Émile Amann, Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin. Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1941, p. 309-311.

[173] Florus of Lyons, col. 217: 'Quod videlicet Deus, praescius omnium futurorum, omnia aeternaliter praescierit quae erant futura, id est et bona et mala; praedestinaverit vero aeternaliter sola bona quae ipse erat facturus, sive gratuita misericordia sua, sive iusto iudicio suo. Et ideo rectissime praescientiam Dei et in bonis et in malis intelligi; praedestinationem vero in solis bonis et iustis, quae ipse non solum praescivit, sed etiam statuit, praefinivit, atque decrevit futura. Iste tamen hanc differentiam propterea commemorat, ut Deum mala praescire potuisse, praedestinare autem non potuisse contendat.'

in time could be solved. Florus explained that predestination did not pertain to God's essence,[174] as Eriugena had taught. Predestination was God's action and this action could not be in God himself but out of himself, directed to the creatures.[175] Thus, predestination was one, but with two effects:[176] human free will was either directed to good when, aided by divine grace, it loved God or directed to evil when, due to its own corrupted nature, it loved the world.[177]

[174] *Ibid*., col. 157: '(...) quia videlicet praescientia et praedestinatio proprie rerum est futurarum: apud Deum vero sicut nihil est praeteritum, ita etiam nihil futurum, in cuius aeterna scientia aeternaliter omnia praesentia sunt (...) praescientiam et praedestinationem non solum Dei, et in Deo esse (quod etiam nos fatemur), sed etiam ipsam substantiam et essentiam Dei esse?'

[175] *Ibid*., col. 118: 'Quomodo igitur operatio in Deo, vel ipse Deus substantialiter (ut iste asserit) operatio intelligi potest? nisi forte eo modo dicatur Deus operatio, non quod ipsum vel in ipso aliquis, sed ipse omnia operetur (...) Et tamen nos, qui simpliciter divinam operationem in operibus et creaturis eius intelligimus, ipsam eius operationem plurali numero in Scripturis positam legimus, manifeste Apostolo dicente: <Divisiones vero gratiarum sunt, idem vero spiritus; et divisiones ministrationum sunt, idem autem Dominus; et divisiones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus, qui operatur omnia in omnibus> (I Cor. 12, 4-6).'

[176] *Ibid*., col. 116: '(...) ita esse Deum substantialiter praedestinationem, sicut veritatem, bonitatem, iustitiam, ut per hoc velut singulari tantum numero praedestinatio dicenda videatur: sicut singulari tantum numero dicitur Deus, veritas, bonitas, iustitia: non tamen ista argumentatione efficere potest ut praedestinatio Dei etiam substantialiter Deus dici possit, non duplicem habeat effectum, et operis distributionem, scilicet vel in praeparatione iustorum ad vitam, vel in praeordinatione impiorum ad interitum: quia et iustitia verissime Deus dicitur: nec cum ipsa Deus substantialiter intelligitur, plurali numero recte enuntiatur. Et tamen iustitia Dei, quae etiam Deus est, sine dubio duplicem habet effectum, videlicet vel in remuneratione bonorum, vel in damnatione malorum. Cum ergo ad praedestinantem Deum recte dicatur relative praedestinatio, sicut ad disponentem dispositio, ad gubernantem gubernatio, ad ordinantem ordinatio, ad operantem operatio, ad creantem creatio: et etiamsi aliquid ratione ostendi possit, substantialiter dici debere praedestinationem Dei, vel praedestinationem Deum: duplex tamen eius effectus Scripturae sanctae immobili veritate declaratus (...)'.

[177] *Ibid*., col. 140: '(...) cum de libero arbitrio tractatur. Quia, sicut diximus, una eademque voluntas mentis alia est cum naturaliter diligit seipsam, alia cum vel gratia adiuta diligit Deum, vel proprio vitio corrupta diligit mundum. Alia est autem et alia non naturae, sed affectionis diversitate. Et ideo potest esse et bona et mala, secundum ea quae diligit vel bene vel male.'

Concerning God's judgment and punishment of the world, Florus accepted Eriugena's (and Augustine's) idea that evil (or sin, or punishment) did not have its own 'nature', that it had no substantial existence. However, he made the distinction between different types of evil: sin was a defect, a vice opposed to good and being and it was not caused by God, but punishment was not a defect; it was an affliction which was foreseen and predetermined by God.[178]

Eriugena did not respond with another treatise or letter to these refutations. Moreover, later on, he did not even object to his condemnation by the council of Valence (855). However, at some point, he returned to the arguments from *De praedestinatione* and refined them in books IV and V of his main work, the *Periphyseon*.

Hincmar, the one who had commissioned the writing of the treatise, failed Eriugena and pretended that he did not even know the author of the nineteen chapters and that these must have been a forgery.[179] In the kingdom of Charles the Bald, seventy seven propositions from the work of Eriugena were refuted by Prudentius, Lupus and Ratramnus, in order to defend the Augustinian doctrine, which they considered thus threatened. After Florus' treatise, something similar happened in the kingdom of Lothar I, where Lyons was the centre of the intellectual life.

[178] *Ibid*., cols. 217-8: '(...) non intelligens illam differentiam mali quam iam superius commendavimus; quod scilicet, aliud sit malum contrarium bono, quod est utique vitium. Nec habet auctorem Deum: aliud vero malum, quod est contrarium paci, quieti, vel sanitati, quod nunquam accidit nisi Deo auctore et iudice; sicut ipse loquitur per prophetam: Ego Dominus faciens pacem et creans malum (Isa. 45, 7). Unde et illud est apud alium prophetam: Si erit malum in civitate, quod Dominus non fecerit (Amos 3, 6). Et iterum: Bona et mala, vita et mors, paupertas et honestas, a Deo sunt (Eccli. 11, 14). Illius itaque mali quod intelligitur in vitio vel peccato, non est praedestinator Deus, quia nec auctor: huius autem mali quod intelligitur in aliqua afflictione, tormento, atque supplicio, vel temporali vel aeterno, quia haec, sicut Scriptura docet, ab ipso sunt, et eius iudicio disponuntur atque inferuntur, manifeste et auctor est et praedestinator, quia et praescivit ea futura, et praedestinavit iuste facienda.'

[179] Hincmar of Rheims, *De praedestinatione* I... [see n. 51], *Preface*, col. 51: 'Quorum capitulorum auctorem nec ibi adnotatum invenimus nec cum multum quaesierimus, invenire valuimus. Unde putavimus quia alicuius invidia ad cuiusdam opinionem infamandam fuerint compilata, sicut saepe legimus.'

In spite of all these, Eriugena seems to have continued to enjoy his privileged position at the court of Charles the Bald. His highly revered position as a scholar and maybe his good mastering of the Greek language seem to have weighed more for the king than his 'unorthodox' opinions regarding Augustine's teachings in general and his doctrine of predestination in particular.

However, Eriugena intervention seems to have changed dramatically the evolution of the debate especially after the reaction of the Church of Lyons and its insistence in defending Augustine's views. For the moment, Gottschalk apparently ceased to be the main controversial figure of the debate and all attention shifted to Eriugena. There were treatises written against Eriugena that were just marginally defending or mentioning Gottschalk, the monk who had formerly raised the Church of Rheims against him and against his views on double predestination.

But all these developments will form the object of the second article announced in the introduction, which will complement this first one in order to provide a more complete view of the matter. This second article will both emphasize the further interventions from the Church of Lyons, which changed the course of the debate on Augustine's views on predestination and the ecclesiastical politics in the Carolingian realm, and formulate and discuss my conclusions of the debate.

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Summary. — This article is the first part of a study offering a historical overview of the debate on double predestination in the 9th-century Carolingian realm. It considers the personalities and the monasteries involved, the treatises written and the councils assembled on the issue of double predestination in order to clarify the theological positions of the various protagonists. The key issues for all of them were Augustine's views on predestination, grace and merit, divine omnipotence and human free will, divine predilection and universal salvific will. They all purported to offer the 'right' interpretation of these theological views albeit from different angles. The study will thus present (in two separate articles) these differences as they are related both to various read-

ings of Augustine in the Carolingian realm and to an unequal distribution of the manuscripts of Augustine's works and also to other factors such as pastoral discourse, political interests and personal ambitions, which may have contributed to the development of the debate.

This first part of the study offers a brief introduction to the debate and considers the above mentioned matters in the way they were first discussed primarily in the northern parts of the Carolingian realm. A second part of the study (to be published also in the *RHE*) will consider the same matters as they were discussed in the southern parts of the Carolingian realm, taking into account the new developments generated by the intervention of the South and offering some conclusion on the entire debate and the study of it.

Résumé — Cet article est la première partie d'une étude qui offre un aperçu historique du débat sur la double prédestination dans le domaine carolingien du 9e s. Il considère les personnalités et les monastères impliqués, les traités écrits et les conciles réunis sur la question de la double prédestination afin de clarifier les positions théologiques des différents protagonistes. Ce qui était au centre du débat pour chacun d'entre eux, c'étaient les idées de S. Augustin sur la prédestination, la grâce et le mérite, la toute-puissance divine et la liberté humaine, la prédilection divine et la volonté salvifique universelle. Ils étaient tous censés offrir l'interprétation « juste » de ces idées théologiques mais sous des angles différents. La présente étude (dans deux articles distincts) se propose de mettre en lumière ces différences, liées à la fois à différentes lectures d'Augustin dans le domaine carolingien, à une répartition inégale des manuscrits des œuvres d'Augustin et à d'autres facteurs encore tels que le discours pastoral, les intérêts politiques et les ambitions personnelles, qui peuvent avoir contribué à l'évolution du débat.

Cette première partie de l'étude propose une brève introduction au débat et considère les questions mentionnées ci-dessus telles qu'elles ont d'abord été discutées principalement dans le nord du royaume carolingien. Une deuxième partie de l'étude (à paraître également dans la RHE) examinera ces mêmes questions, telles qu'elles ont été débattues dans les parties méridionales du royaume carolingien, elle prendra en compte les nouveaux développements générés par l'intervention du Sud et offrira une conclusion à l'ensemble du débat et de l'étude.

Zusammenfassung. — Dieser Artikel ist der erste Teil einer Studie, die eine historische Übersicht der Debatte über die doppelte Prädestination im Karolingischen Reich des 9. Jahrhunderts bietet. Die Studie berücksichtigt die dabei involvierten Persönlichkeiten und Klöster, sowie die Traktate und Konzilien zum Thema der doppelten Prädestination, in der Absicht, die theologischen Positionen der verschiedenen Protagonisten zu verdeutlichen. Das Schüsselproblem aller waren Augustinus

Ansichten über Prädestination, Gnade und Verdienst, göttliche Allmacht und menschlichen freien Wille, die göttliche Prädilektion und den universellen Erlösungswillen. Sie alle behaupten, die „korrekte“ Interpretation dieser theologischen Ansichten zu sein, sei es aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Die vorliegende Studie wird darum (in zwei Beiträgen) die Unterschiede darlegen, die mit den unterschiedlichen Lesarten von Augustinus im Karolingischen Reich und der ungleichen Verbreitung der Manuskripte des Augustinus zusammenhängen, als auch mit anderen Faktoren wie dem pastoralen Diskurs, politischen Interessen und persönlichen Ambitionen, die zur Entwicklung der Debatte beigetragen haben können.

Dieser erste Teil der Studie bietet eine kurze Einführung in die Debatte und untersucht die oben erwähnten Themen, wie sie anfangs hauptsächlich in den nördlichen Teilen des Karolingischen Reiches diskutiert wurden. Der zweite Teil der Studie (der ebenfalls in der RHE veröffentlicht werden wird) konzentriert sich auf die südlichen Teile des Karolingischen Reiches. Berücksichtigt werden dabei die durch die Intervention des Südens verursachten neuen Entwicklungen. Schlussfolgerungen zur gesamten Debatte und zu dieser Studie schließen den Beitrag ab.